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Anita T. M. Jansen
Maastricht University
Studies obtaining implicit measures of associations in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed., Text Revision; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) Axis I psychopathology are
organized into three categories: (a) studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls, (b)
experimental validity studies, and (c) incremental and predictive validity studies. In the first category,
implicit measures of disorder-relevant associations were consistent with explicit beliefs for some
disorders (e.g., specific phobia), but for other disorders evidence was either mixed (e.g., panic disorder)
or inconsistent with explicit beliefs (e.g., pain disorder). For substance use disorders and overeating,
expected positive and unexpected negative associations with craved substances were found consistently.
Contrary to expectation, implicit measures of self-esteem were consistently positive for patients with
depressive disorder, social phobia, and body dysmorphic disorder. In the second category, short-term
manipulations of disorder-relevant states generally affected implicit measures as expected. Therapeutic
interventions affected implicit measures for one type of specific phobia, social phobia, and panic
disorder, but not for alcohol use disorders or obesity. In the third category, implicit measures had
predictive value for certain psychopathological behaviors, sometimes moderated by the availability of
cognitive resources (e.g., for alcohol and food, only when cognitive resources were limited). The
strengths of implicit measures include (a) converging evidence for dysfunctional beliefs regarding certain
disorders and consistent new insights for other disorders and (b) prediction of some psychopathological
behaviors that explicit measures cannot explain. Weaknesses include (a) that findings were inconsistent
for some disorders, raising doubts about the validity of the measures, and (b) that understanding of the
concept “implicit” is incomplete.
Keywords: implicit measures, psychopathology, validity
Over the past decade, indirect measurement procedures such as
the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) and the affective priming paradigm (APP; Fazio,
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) have become increasingly
popular in psychopathology research. No doubt their popularity
rests on their potential for extending measurements of disorder-
relevant psychological attributes beyond what direct self-
assessment can reveal. Traditionally, psychopathology researchers
had relied largely on self-assessment questionnaires to obtain
measures of patients’ beliefs and feelings, measures that therefore
were necessarily explicit. An important limitation of explicit mea-
sures is that they depend on patient introspection although we
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know that people do not have introspective access to all of the
mechanisms that underlie their behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Indeed, this limitation featured centrally in early approaches to
psychopathology (Freud, 1901/1914). Explicit measures are also
subject to other criticisms, including their sensitivity to socially
desirable answering tendencies and the fact that people sometimes
may dismiss as irrelevant cognitions that actually are relevant
(Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001).
To complement these explicit measures of psychological at-
tributes, researchers have designed procedures such as the IAT and
the APP to obtain implicit measures. De Houwer, Teige-
Mocigemba, Spruyt, and Moors (2009a) defined an implicit mea-
sure as “a measurement outcome that is causally produced by the
to-be-measured attribute in the absence of certain goals, aware-
ness, substantial cognitive resources, or substantial time” (p. 350).
It is important to keep in mind that implicitness is not an all-or-
none feature of a measure (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). For
example, a measure can be labeled as implicit in the sense that
people are unaware of (the origin of) their association or cannot
control the process that leads to the measurement outcome. Thus,
not all implicit measures possess the same features of implicitness.
De Houwer and colleagues (De Houwer, 2006, 2009; De Houwer
et al., 2009a) provide extensive reviews of the degree to which
various implicit measures meet the criteria for implicitness.
To the extent that implicit measures reflect uncontrollable, un-
aware, fast mechanisms, they could provide information that aug-
ments that from explicit measures. This is important in psychopa-
thology research where self-presentation strategies are always of
concern. For example, when in a clinic, some patients with alcohol
dependence may have difficulty admitting their strong positive
attitude toward alcohol. To the extent that implicit measures can-
not be controlled (faked), they can provide important information.
In addition, measures that are implicit in the sense that they are
produced by attributes of which the person is unaware could reveal
insights beyond those of conscious (explicit) measures. Moreover,
measurement procedures that are implicit in the sense that they are
based on rapid processing (notably involving speeded response
times) are more likely to capture automatic effects of psycholog-
ical attributes than are self-paced measures (cf. MacLeod, 2008,
regarding distinguishing implicit from explicit memory).
The distinction between implicit and explicit measures origi-
nally gave rise to a debate about which measure reflects a person’s
true attitude, a debate that Fazio and Olson (2003) facetitiously
characterized as “Will the real attitude please stand up?” (p. 304).
Current thinking treats implicit and explicit measures as comple-
mentary rather than as competitors, with neither paramount. As
reflected in dual-process models (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen,
1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), both
types of measures are true in the sense that both have predictive
validity. These models specify the conditions under which each
type of measure is theorized to be predictive of behavior: Explicit
measures are expected to be predictive when resources used for
cognitive control are high, whereas implicit measures are expected
to be predictive when these resources are low. Thus, when re-
sources are limited either because of time constraints or competing
cognitive demands, people have no time to deliberate and therefore
behavior is best predicted by implicit measures.
In psychopathology research, an implicit measure is often as-
sumed to reflect the strength of association between a disorder-
relevant target (e.g., the self in depression) and an attribute (e.g.,
negative). These targets and attributes have been derived from two
possible sources, both related to the dysfunctional beliefs held by
those with the disorder. The first concerns dysfunctional beliefs
(e.g., a patient suffering from depression typically holds the dys-
functional belief “I am worthless”), as specified in the principal
cognitive theories, often based on Beck’s cognitive approach to
psychopathology (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Beck, Freeman, &
Davis, 2004; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The second
concerns dysfunctional beliefs that are apparent either from the
main characteristics of the disorder as specified in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., Text Revision
[DSM–IV–TR]; American Psychiatric Association, 2000; e.g., a
patient with social phobia is afraid of humiliation or of a negative
evaluation in social situations) or from clinical observation (e.g.,
craving in substance use disorders). Therefore, implicit measures
are taken to reflect associations between disorder-relevant targets
and particular focal attributes. As a result, they have the potential
to reveal aspects of the dysfunctional beliefs that explicit measures
cannot reveal and to predict behaviors that explicit measures do
not predict.
To help achieve conceptual clarity with respect to the term
implicit measure, we note the usefulness of distinguishing between
measurement procedures and measurement outcomes (De Houwer,
2006; De Houwer et al., 2009a). A measurement procedure (e.g.,
IAT) is simply the specific experimental methodology, the set of
guidelines followed that lead to an outcome. A measurement
outcome is the result of the measurement procedure. We prefer to
reserve the term measure for the measurement outcome, so in this
article, we use the term implicit measure to refer to the outcome of
a measurement procedure such as the IAT or the APP. This is also
a good point at which to note that the theory for a particular
disorder as described in this review is often not the only cognitive
theory for the disorder. We chose to describe those theories that
inspired the work using implicit measures.
With this background, we can now state our goal for this article:
to provide an integrative review of studies that obtained implicit
measures of disorder-relevant associations. In the service of this
goal, the article is structured as follows. First, the various mea-
surement procedures that have been used in psychopathology
research are explained, along with a brief discussion of the reli-
ability and validity of each. This review includes studies with
indirect measurement procedures, such as the IAT (Greenwald et
al., 1998) and variants on this test, the APP (Fazio et al., 1986), the
Affective Simon Task (De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Her-
mans, 2001; De Houwer & Eelen, 1998), the Extrinsic Affective
Simon Task (De Houwer, 2003b), and approach and avoidance
tasks (De Houwer et al., 2001; Rinck & Becker, 2007). For the
approach and avoidance tasks, because approach is related to
positive valence and avoidance to negative valence, performance
on these tasks is theorized to reflect affective associations. Al-
though memory and attentional biases likely will also contribute to
our understanding of dysfunctional beliefs, they are not included in
this review because they have been extensively reviewed else-
where (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Williams,
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Second, the convergent and dis-
criminant validity of implicit measures is discussed. These set the
stage for the third and major part third and major part—a review
of research using implicit measures in psychopathology.








































































































The studies included in this review are structured into three
categories (see De Houwer et al., 2009a) as follows.
Studies Comparing Groups Having a Disorder
With Controls
In this quasi-experimental approach, a disordered group is com-
pared to a healthy group. The typical expectation is that there will
be a disorder-congruent association in the disordered group but
that this association will be weaker or absent in the healthy control
group. An example would be an implicit measure that reflects a
negative association with spiders that is specific to individuals
with spider phobia (see, e.g., Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, &
Trezise, 1986). Somewhat less consistent with dysfunctional be-
liefs is an implicit measure that reflects a disorder-incongruent
association that is weaker in a disordered group than in a healthy
control group. For example, finding reduced positive implicit
self-esteem in depressed patients as compared with healthy con-
trols is not fully in line with the negative dysfunctional belief of
depressed individuals regarding the self (D. A. Clark, Beck, &
Alford, 1999) but does show that the self-esteem of depressed
patients is relatively negative compared with that of healthy con-
trols.
Experimental Validity Studies
In this category, there are two types of experimental studies. The
first involves manipulating an aspect of the psychopathology to
study its effect on the implicit measure. For example, deprivational
state in nicotine-dependent people could be manipulated to affect
craving (Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003). In the
second type of study, the effect of clinical treatment on implicit
measures is examined. In these two types of study, if the manip-
ulation or the treatment affects the implicit measure, that outcome
is taken as evidence that the cognitive process indexed by the
implicit measure plays a role in that type of psychopathology. This
approach rests on two assumptions: (a) that the psychological
attributes of interest are amenable to change and (b) that observed
changes in an implicit measure are due to changes in the psycho-
logical attribute of interest rather than in some other process (De
Houwer et al., 2009a). If these assumptions are satisfied, then these
types of studies can yield stronger causal inferences than the
quasi-experimental known-groups approach, because the risk of
unrecognized confounds is reduced.
Incremental and Predictive Validity Studies
The third kind of study asks whether an implicit measure can
predict a pathological behavior and, if so, whether it can do so
beyond what can be explained by analogous explicit measures
(e.g., study whether implicit measures of associations with alcohol
have incremental validity for explaining alcohol use; Houben &
Wiers, 2006b). The dependent variables in such studies have been
either self-reported or actually observed behavior. They have also
varied in the extent to which they motivated behavioral control or
demanded cognitive resources, which is relevant because dual-
process models of information processing (e.g., Fazio & Towles-
Schwen, 1999) state that the accurate prediction of behavior with
implicit and explicit measures depends on these factors.
Measurement Procedures
In each of the measurement procedures, participants are pre-
sented with single picture or word stimuli representing disorder-
relevant targets (e.g., spider) and attributes (e.g., afraid). Partici-
pants are instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as
possible to these stimuli. Response latency and accuracy are the
main dependent variables; ordinarily, latency is the variable of
primary interest. The general idea behind the use of these para-
digms is that a certain pattern of response latencies and error
percentages can serve as an index of the strength of target-attribute
associations in memory. We describe four paradigms (and varia-
tions) widely used in psychopathology research, and we discuss
the validity and reliability of their outcomes. As is so often true
with empirical measures throughout psychological research, infor-
mation on reliability is limited and thus is described only when it
is available. A more extensive review of the validity and reliability
of some of these measures can be found in De Houwer et al.
(2009a).
The Implicit Association Test
The task in the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) is to categorize
each presented stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible
according to a target dimension (e.g., high-fat foods vs. low-fat
foods) or an attribute dimension (e.g., positive vs. negative). For
example, chocolate should be categorized as a high-fat food,
whereas happy should be categorized as positive. In the critical
combination phases of the IAT, participants perform a double-
categorization task. In one of these combination phases, they are
instructed to make a binary decision for stimuli from two dimen-
sions simultaneously: one from the target dimension and one from
the attribute dimension (e.g., press the left button for high-fat foods
and positive words; press the right button for low-fat foods and
negative words). In the other combination phase, the response
assignment is reversed for the target dimension (e.g., press the left
button for low-fat foods and positive words; press the right button
for high-fat foods and negative words).
The IAT effect is typically calculated as the difference in
average response latency (and/or percentage of errors) between
these two combination phases. The logic behind the IAT is that
people perform better when two associated targets/attributes share
a response key than when two nonassociated targets/attributes
share a response key. As used here, “associated” means that these
targets/attributes are connected in the participant’s mind. There-
fore, if participants are better at responding when the combination
is high fat and positive versus low fat and negative than when the
combination is reversed, the conclusion would be that the partic-
ipants have a more positive association with high-fat foods than
with low-fat foods, even though this is an association that they
might well not admit to were they directly queried.
Evidence for the validity of the IAT effect as an index of
affective associations was first described in the seminal article by
Greenwald et al. (1998). Their experiment tested affective associ-
ations to concepts to which people are expected to have relatively
uniform associations: flowers and insects. Participants were faster







































































































in the compatible phase (flowers–positive and insects–negative)
than in the incompatible phase (flowers–negative and insects–
positive), clearly showing that the IAT can capture affective as-
sociations. Since then, many studies have replicated and extended
the basic paradigm and finding of Greenwald et al.
Converging support comes from studies in which novel affec-
tive associations were created for previously unknown stimuli with
a classical conditioning procedure. Both IAT results and an anal-
ogous explicit measure reflected these newly created attitudes
despite participants showing no awareness that the conditioned
stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US) were contingently
paired (Olson & Fazio, 2001). Because affective associations
appear to be the only likely source of the IAT effect, this consti-
tutes strong evidence that the IAT can capture affective associa-
tions. On the basis of these studies and the evidence reviewed
elsewhere (De Houwer et al., 2009a), it is now generally accepted
that IAT effects can reflect affective associations, although other
potential sources of IAT effects have also been identified (Das-
gupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; De Houwer, Geldof,
& De Bruycker, 2005; Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006;
Mierke & Klauer, 2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2001, 2004).
Research has shown that IAT measures are indeed less control-
lable than are explicit measures, which is good news for the claim
that IAT measures are implicit. For example, when instructed to
appear either conscientious or not conscientious, participants were
less able to do so on an IAT measure than on a self-report measure
(Steffens, 2004). However, at least some studies have shown that
IAT measures are not implicit in the sense that people are unaware
of the associations that a particular IAT aims to assess. For
example, in a racial attitude IAT, a considerable proportion of
Caucasian participants felt the IAT effect, in that they realized that
they were slower in the black–positive/white–negative block than
in the black–negative/white–positive block. More than one third of
these participants attributed this slowness to racial associations
(Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001), which shows that
participants often are aware of what the IAT is intended to assess.
Note that the IAT effect did not itself depend on such awareness.
In general, both the internal consistency (r/  .7 to .9) and the
test–retest reliability (median r  .56) for the IAT are moderately
good (see De Houwer et al., 2009a; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji,
2007).
Variants on the Implicit Association Test
Variants on the IAT have been designed, some of which have
had the goal of solving limitations of the original IAT. In all of
these variants, the basic task and the type of stimuli are similar to
the original IAT: Participants are asked to sort single word or
picture stimuli into predefined categories. The logic and compu-
tation of effect scores are also the same as in the original IAT.
These variants derive some superficial validity from their struc-
tural similarities with the original IAT, but in some cases studies
with normatively positive and negative stimuli provide formal
evidence of their validity (e.g., Nosek & Banaji, 2001). We con-
sider five such variants.
Personalized Implicit Association Test. The goal of this
modification was to make more direct reference to the self. To
achieve this, the personalized IAT differs from the original IAT in
two main ways: (a) It uses as attribute labels “I like” and “I
dislike” instead of the more normative “positive” and “negative”
and (b) it does not provide error feedback. Target categories (e.g.,
high-fat foods vs. low-fat foods) are the same as in the regular
IAT. The personalized IAT was intended to focus on the individ-
ual, thereby reducing the influence of extrapersonal associations,
such as those that are part of a culture, on the original IAT (Olson
& Fazio, 2004; Olson, Fazio, & Han, 2009). Note, however, that
Nosek and Hansen (2008) argued against culture as a contaminat-
ing influence on the IAT and additionally pointed to the futility of
attempting to separate cultural from personal influences on re-
sponses to the IAT.
Single-Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT). The
SC-IAT uses only one target category (e.g., alcohol; Karpinski &
Steinman, 2006). The measure was developed to achieve a mea-
sure of absolute (rather than relative) strength of association be-
tween a target category and attribute categories. As Greenwald and
Farnham (2000) acknowledged, the original IAT can yield only
relative strength measures. For example, the standard self-esteem
IAT assesses associations between me– other and positive–
negative, indicating whether a person has more positive/negative
associations with me than with other but not indicating the strength
of the evaluation of either me or other. This need not be a
weakness, considering that many categories have a naturally op-
posing contrast category, but for research questions where no such
contrast category exists (e.g., for cocaine or spiders), it is prefer-
able to have an IAT-like task that does not require a contrast
category. The SC-IAT contains two combination blocks. In one,
the target category shares a response key with positive attributes;
the other key is pressed for negative attributes. In the other critical
block, the target key assignment is shared with negative attributes.
Note that the SC-IAT is essentially identical to the single-target
IAT (ST-IAT; Bluemke & Friese, 2008). Initial studies reported
that the SC-IAT had comparable internal consistency (.69) to the
original IAT (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006).
Unipolar Implicit Association Test. As discussed, the orig-
inal IAT is limited in yielding relative—not absolute—attribute
information. For example, it can only be concluded that certain
associations are more positive than negative. However, for some
attitude objects (e.g., chocolate), it may be relevant to assess the
negative (e.g., unhealthy) and positive (e.g., palatable) associations
independently (de Liver, van der Pligt, & Wigboldus, 2007).
Therefore, the unipolar IAT was developed, in which an attribute
category of interest (e.g., positive) is contrasted with neutral (see,
e.g., Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). For example, positive and
negative associations with the target alcohol versus the target soft
drinks can be assessed independently by contrasting positive with
neutral and negative with neutral associations in separate unipolar
IATs. Note that a single-category variant of the unipolar IAT has
also been used (see, e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2008a). The reported
internal consistency of the unipolar IAT has ranged rather widely
from .29 to .77 (Houben & Wiers, 2009).
Go/no-go Implicit Association Test. The go/no-go IAT
(Nosek & Banaji, 2001), like the SC-IAT, has the advantage that
it can assess attitudes toward a single target category. Participants
are required to respond on go trials: In one condition, participants
respond to the target category (e.g., fruit) and one attribute cate-
gory (e.g., positive). In another condition, they respond to the same
target category and an alternative attribute category (e.g., nega-
tive). On no-go trials in both conditions, participants withhold







































































































responses to stimuli that do not belong to one of these categories.
In this example, associations with fruit should be reflected in the
difference in the ease of responding between the two conditions.
Manipulating what is presented on no-go trials can influence the
context in which an attitude is assessed. For example, the target
category fruit can be assessed in isolation, that is, without stimuli
from a contrasting target category being presented on no-go trials.
In this case, only negative or positive stimuli would be presented
on no-go trials. If the researcher desires to assess associations with
a target category in comparison to a contrast category (e.g.,
snacks), stimuli from this contrast category should be included
among the no-go trials as well. The reported internal consistency
of the go/no-go IAT has varied from low (.20; Nosek & Banaji,
2001) to considerably higher (.50 to .82; Boldero, Rawlings, &
Haslam, 2007; Leeuw, Peters, Wiers, & Vlaeyen, 2007).
Affective Simon Task. In a typical Affective Simon Task
(De Houwer et al., 2001; De Houwer & Eelen, 1998), the person
responds to each stimulus by saying a positive or a negative word
aloud. The interesting element of the task is that the person is
instructed to ignore the affective meaning of the stimulus, respond-
ing instead on the basis of a nonaffective property of the stimulus,
such as grammatical category or lettercase. For example, an indi-
vidual might be asked to say “positive” when he or she sees a noun
and to say “negative” when he or she sees an adjective. The
validity of this measure as an index of affective associations is
supported by De Houwer and Eelen’s (1998) finding that partici-
pants responded faster when the task-irrelevant valence of a stim-
ulus and the required response were congruent. For example, for
the stimulus SUNSHINE, people were faster when told to say
“positive” than when told to say “negative” in response to upper-
case words.
De Houwer (2003b) introduced a useful variant on the Affective
Simon Task —the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST). In this
version, the participant responds using buttons associated with a
certain affective value during the task (hence, extrinsic) rather than
with an actual affective response such as “positive” or “negative”
(hence, intrinsic). In the initial version of the EAST, white, blue,
and green words were presented. The white words were either
positive or negative, and participants classified these words as such
by pressing one key for positive words and another key for
negative words (e.g., left for positive, right for negative). The
colored words were the target concepts (e.g., spiders). Participants
categorized these words on the basis of their color (e.g., left for
blue, right for green). In the critical blocks, white and colored
words were mixed. In this example, it should be easier for an
individual with spider phobia to respond to spider words in green
than to those in blue because green words and negative words have
been assigned a common response key. A virtue of the Affective
Simon Task and the EAST is that computation of its effect does
not depend on comparing two separate trial blocks as is the case in
the IAT, the SC-IAT, and the go/no-go IAT (combination vs.
reversed combination); instead, the effect can be assessed in a
single block, avoiding complicating order effects.
Variants of the EAST include a pictorial version (Huijding & de
Jong, 2005a, 2005b) and the identification-EAST (ID-EAST), in
which participants are instructed to process the meaning of the
target stimuli (De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). The validity of
the EAST is supported by studies showing that it can assess
affective associations with normatively positive and negative stim-
uli (De Houwer, 2003b). Although the EAST has generally shown
quite low internal consistency (r  .12 to .55; De Houwer, 2003b;
Leeuw et al., 2007; Teige, Schnabel, Banse, & Asendorpf, 2004),
the internal consistency of the ID-EAST has been considerably
better (  .60 to .66; De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007).
The Affective Priming Paradigm
The APP (Fazio et al., 1986; Klauer & Musch, 2003) is the other
very popular technique. In this task, two stimuli are presented in
quick succession: a prime followed by a target. Prime stimuli
represent the concepts of interest (e.g., spiders vs. butterflies) and
target stimuli represent the attribute categories (e.g., positive vs.
negative). No response is required to the prime, but participants
must respond to the target by evaluating it as being positive or
negative or by just naming it. The purpose of the priming paradigm
is to determine the extent to which the presentation of the prime
influences the response to the target. The critical idea is that
affectively congruent prime–target pairs (e.g., spider–awful)
should lead to shorter response latencies to the target word than
should affectively incongruent prime–target pairs (e.g., spider–
happy) (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio et al.,
1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994, 2001). To the extent
that such a pattern of affective priming is observed, it is taken to
reflect the person’s evaluation of the prime (e.g., spiders).
The validity of the APP is supported by studies showing that it
can capture affective associations with stimuli that most people
normatively evaluate negatively (e.g., disaster) or positively (e.g.,
holidays; e.g., Fazio, 2001) and with stimuli for which novel
affective associations were created experimentally (e.g., Olson &
Fazio, 2002). Research has shown that APP effects (a) are based
on fast and relatively efficient processes, (b) can be found in the
absence of awareness of the prime or of the origin of the attitude
toward the prime, and (c) can be obtained without the intention to
evaluate the prime (see De Houwer et al., 2009a, for a review).
These findings all support the view that the APP yields valid
implicit information. Some studies, however, have reported low
internal consistency (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000:
  .16 to .49; Olson & Fazio, 2003: r  .04) and test–retest
reliability (.08 to .28; Bosson et al., 2000). Studies conducted with
latent variable analyses (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001),
which correct for measurement error, have shown substantially
improved interitem consistency ( .64) and test–retest reliability
(stability estimate  .68).
Cunningham et al. (2001) noted that response-latency measures
are vulnerable to low reliability because individual response laten-
cies fluctuate over trials. Of course, this is more true, the fewer the
number of trials there are per condition, so investigators should be
careful to include as many trials per condition as is feasible. Note,
too, that this criticism should apply to any response-time–based
measure but that it may particularly apply to measurement proce-
dures, such as the APP, in which the person does not need to
categorize stimuli into predefined categories. This freedom leaves
more room for different interpretations of the presented stimuli
(Olson & Fazio, 2003), which necessarily promotes variability
over trials.







































































































Approach and Avoidance Tasks
Approach and avoidance have long been at the heart of work on
animal motivation and learning, so it is not surprising that these
concepts are also of interest in studying human behavior. Consider
one variant of an approach and avoidance task—the stimulus–
response compatibility task (De Houwer et al., 2001; Mogg, Brad-
ley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003; Mogg, Field, & Bradley, 2005).
Participants are instructed to move a mannequin figure on the
computer monitor toward one category of pictures and away from
another category of pictures. For example, in one of the two
critical phases, the mannequin is to be moved toward smoking-
related pictures and away from neutral pictures. In the other critical
phase, the assignment of mannequin responses is reversed. The
difference score between the two phases is taken to indicate the
relative approach–avoidance tendency toward the focal category of
pictures (i.e., those related to smoking).
Several other variants of the approach–avoidance task (Chen &
Bargh, 1999) have been introduced (e.g., Fishbach & Shah, 2006;
Rinck & Becker, 2007). One such variant is similar to the
stimulus–response compatibility task except that participants have
to pull a joystick toward themselves for one category of pictures
(e.g., smoking) and push it away from themselves for another
category of pictures (e.g., neutral). In a further clever variant
(Rinck & Becker, 2007), pushing makes the picture increasingly
smaller (which is considered an index of avoidance) and pulling
makes the picture increasingly bigger (which is considered an
index of approach). In some types of approach–avoidance task, the
participant’s response is based on the picture contents (e.g., push
spider pictures and pull neutral pictures), which could be seen as
more direct and possibly not as implicit. In other types, responding
is based on an aspect of the stimulus not related to its content (e.g.,
push landscape-oriented pictures and pull portrait-oriented pic-
tures). The task would appear to be more indirect and therefore
possibly more implicit when the participant’s response is based on
the more unobtrusive content-irrelevant aspect, and this procedural
difference might influence measurement outcomes.
Some variants of the approach–avoidance task have shown
evidence of validity. The stimulus–response compatibility task has
successfully assessed approach and avoidance tendencies toward
normatively valenced stimuli (De Houwer et al., 2001), and a
version of the approach–avoidance task has done so for stimuli
about which participants held strongly positive or negative atti-
tudes (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Other variants of the approach–
avoidance task (Rinck & Becker, 2007) have shown fairly good
internal consistency (.71 to .80).
Convergent and Discriminant Validity With Explicit
Measures and Other Implicit Measures
Some might assume that implicit measures should show con-
vergent validity with explicit measures assessing the same con-
struct—that implicit–explicit correspondence should be high. If
this were the case, however, then the added value of implicit
measures would be questionable. In fact, it has consistently been
found that implicit and explicit measures are related but also are
distinct and that their variance is often best represented by two
latent factors (Nosek & Smyth, 2007). Moreover, the strength of
the correspondence between implicit and explicit measures has
been shown to vary as a function of the research domain (Hof-
mann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek,
2005). To illustrate, a large Internet study on implicit measures of
preferences conducted with the IAT showed the average implicit–
explicit correspondence over 57 domains to be r  .36, with
correlations ranging from r  .05 (females–males) to r  .70
(prochoice–prolife) depending on the target categories (Nosek,
2005).
Several moderators have been identified that explain the vari-
ability in implicit–explicit correspondence (Hofmann et al., 2005;
Nosek, 2005). For the IAT, implicit–explicit correspondence was
higher (a) when self-presentation concerns were weak (e.g., Coke
vs. Pepsi) as opposed to when they were strong (e.g., thin vs.
overweight people); (b) when the research topic elicited more
spontaneity on the explicit measure (e.g., self-report measures on
spider phobias vs. morality); (c) for explicit measures that reflected
affective evaluations (e.g., feeling thermometers) rather than cog-
nitive evaluations (e.g., semantic differentials), consistent with the
view that implicit measures reflect affective evaluations; (d) for
explicit measures that contain the same type of relativity as the
IAT (e.g., self vs. other), as opposed to those that reflect absolute
evaluations (e.g., self-esteem); (e) for stronger evaluations (e.g.,
prochoice vs. prolife) than for weaker evaluations (e.g., short
people vs. tall people); and (f) for evaluations perceived as unique,
as more distinct from the norm (e.g., veganism vs. chocolate).
Although these moderating factors have been well established only
for the IAT, it is possible that some of them affect implicit–explicit
correspondence for other measurement procedures as well, which
would provide reassuring convergence across the measures. For
the APP, the motivation to hide prejudice was a moderating factor,
in that implicit–explicit correspondence was only observed for
participants who were rather unmotivated to hide their prejudice
(Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995).
One general reason for a low correlation between implicit and
explicit measures could be that they are obtained with very differ-
ent procedures (method variance). In support of this, the correla-
tion between these two types of measures greatly increased when
the measurement procedures were made as similar as possible, by
using the same response metric and the same type of stimuli in
both measurement procedures, with the only remaining difference
being that one was a direct assessment and the other an indirect
assessment of evaluations (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). In
addition, a low implicit–explicit correlation can be the result of a
low reliability of one or both measures. This has also been a key
issue in the cognitive literature on implicit versus explicit memory,
with some evidence that implicit measures are sometimes unreli-
able (Buchner & Wippich, 2000).
Although one might expect two implicit measures reflecting
similar associations to correlate strongly, this has not been the case
either in psychopathology research (e.g., nicotine dependence:
Sherman et al., 2003; alcohol abuse: Thush et al., 2007) or in other
types of research (Bosson et al., 2000; Cunningham et al., 2001).
This lack of convergent validity may be partly explained by the
inconsistency in procedures used to obtain implicit measures.
Indeed, when using a latent variable approach, which corrects for
this inconsistency, IAT and APP effects were found to correlate
substantially (r  .63; Cunningham et al., 2001). In addition, IAT
and APP effects corresponded more strongly when the APP pro-
cedures were modified to more closely match those of the IAT, in







































































































that participants were told to focus on the categories (e.g., Black
vs. White) rather than the exemplars (e.g., individual Black and
White faces; Olson & Fazio, 2003). These findings are reassuring
with regard to the coherence of the implicit concepts they seek to
measure. To increase the chance for meaningful correlations to
emerge, future research should limit method variance and either
use reliable measures or correct for measurement error.
With the preceding discussion on convergent validity in mind, in
the review section on psychopathology research that has used
implicit measures, the degree of implicit–explicit correlation in
each reviewed form of psychopathology is briefly addressed, and
all implicit–explicit correlations are listed in Tables 1 through 12.
Note that the sign of the correlations was recoded where necessary
so that the values could be interpreted in the same way across and
within studies. A positive correlation indicates that the directions
of the implicit and explicit measure were the same; a negative
correlation indicates that the two measures had opposite directions.
Overall, a fair degree of implicit–explicit correspondence was
observed, although correlations generally were not very high.
Psychopathology Research Conducted With
Implicit Measures
Following a sketch of each disorder, we describe characteristic
dysfunctional beliefs and provide a brief discussion of the empir-
ical support for these beliefs. Where possible, we also provide
implicit–explicit correlations. Relevant research is discussed ac-
cording to the three approaches, omitting sections where no studies
were available within an approach for a particular disorder. Sum-
maries are included where there is a sufficiently large literature.
Specific Phobia
Table 1 presents results of studies on specific phobia. Individ-
uals with a specific phobia experience intense distress when con-
fronted with a specific stimulus or situation, ranging from heights
to blood to public speaking. Exposure to the phobic stimulus or
situation is therefore avoided or endured with extreme distress
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). People with specific
phobias have been shown—not surprisingly—to hold explicit
threat-related beliefs, such as “the spider will suddenly approach
me” (e.g., Arntz, Lavy, Van der Berg, & Van Rijsoort, 1993;
Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1995). Implicit measures are therefore ex-
pected to reflect negative associations with these objects of fear
(de Jong & Muris, 2002). For pragmatic reasons—the high prev-
alence of this phobia (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
and the ready availability of the object of fear for behavioral
measures—research with implicit measures involving specific
phobias has focused exclusively on spider phobia.
For spider phobia, implicit–explicit correlations range from r 
.21 to .67, with most studies reporting the expected positive
implicit–explicit correlations. Correlations are stronger for ap-
proach and avoidance tasks and for implicit measures that tested
for associations with more specific spider-related attributes such as
disgust and danger as opposed to less specific attributes such as
positive and negative. The highest correlations (rs  .50 to .67)
were observed in a study (Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001) in
which the explicit and implicit measures made the same kind of
relative comparisons (spiders vs. snakes), in line with the point just
made about the importance of minimizing method variance.
Studies comparing having a disorder with controls. Sev-
eral studies have shown that spider-fearful individuals have a
characteristic pattern of affective associations to spiders. In Teach-
man et al. (2001), individuals with spider versus snake phobias
performed four IATs, with spiders and snakes as the target cate-
gories and good–bad, danger–safety, disgusting–appealing, and
afraid–unafraid as the attribute categories. Each of the IAT mea-
sures clearly differentiated the two phobic groups and, when
combined into one variable, correctly classified 92% of the indi-
viduals as suffering from snake or spider phobia. Further research
showed that IAT measures of spider associations also differenti-
ated between highly fearful participants and nonfearful controls
(Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2006; Huijding & de Jong, 2007;
Teachman & Woody, 2003) and even spider enthusiasts (Ellwart et
al., 2006).
Using a pictorial version of the EAST, Huijding and de Jong
(2005b) found that both high- and low-fearful students had nega-
tive associations with spider stimuli, an effect more pronounced in
the high-fearful participants. In a later study, this EAST measure
significantly differentiated between treatment-seeking spider-
fearful individuals and nonfearful controls (Huijding & de Jong,
2009). In addition, a go/no-go IAT measure was also successful in
distinguishing between high and low spider-fearful participants
(Teachman, 2007). Converging evidence was found with an
approach–avoidance task: In each of three experiments, spider-
fearful individuals showed more avoidance of spider pictures than
did healthy controls, whereas no such difference emerged for
neutral pictures (Rinck & Becker, 2007).
In contrast, high and low spider-fearful individuals showed
similar negative affective associations with spiders on an IAT
(where spiders were contrasted to the neutral category)1 as well as
on an Affective Simon Task (de Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek, &
Huijding, 2003). One explanation for this contrasting finding could
be that de Jong et al. used verbal stimuli (i.e., words such as web
and legs), whereas other researchers (Ellwart et al., 2006; Huijding
& de Jong, 2007; Teachman et al., 2001; Teachman & Woody,
2003) used pictures of spiders. Words may provide an insuffi-
ciently strong threat cue to differentiate between high- and low-
fearful individuals (cf. Foa & Kozak, 1986; Huijding & de Jong,
2005b).
Experimental validity studies. Although specific negative
beliefs are assumed to be generally associated with certain forms
of psychopathology, it is important to realize that these beliefs may
become more or less salient depending on the context (Williams,
Watts, MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997). Ellwart, Becker, and Rinck
(2005) tested this idea in a study in which participants completed
1 The IAT used by de Jong and colleagues (de Jong, 2002; de Jong et al.,
2001, 2003) was, in fact, a learning task: Participants were instructed to
determine for themselves what the correct key assignments were. Conse-
quently, no category labels were displayed during the task. Additionally,
the task consisted of only four phases, with the combined sorting of targets
and attributes using the reverse response requirement following directly
after the initial combined sorting task, without a practice phase. The idea
was that one would learn a particular target–attribute combination (and
unlearn the other) faster when that combination was congruent with the
preexisting memory structure.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































two identical EAST procedures with ambiguous target words (e.g.,
crawl, legs, hairy). The first EAST was preceded by a series of
human adult and baby pictures. The second EAST was preceded
by a series of spider pictures. After the human-picture priming,
there was no evidence of negative spider associations in either
spider-fearful or nonfearful participants. However, spider-fearful
participants did show negative spider associations after spider-
picture priming, whereas there was no such effect in nonfearful
controls. Thus, the ambiguous target words evoked negative asso-
ciations in individuals with spider phobia only when these words
were put into a spider-related context. Context dependency makes
intuitive sense, so it is good to see it occur.
Apart from this contextual influence, a clinically relevant ques-
tion is whether implicit measures of spider associations can change
during treatment. This question goes back at least to the study by
Watts et al. (1986), where the emotional Stroop effect was admin-
istered to spider-phobic individuals pre- and posttreatment. To test
the effect of a three-session exposure therapy, Teachman and
Woody (2003) compared a treatment group of spider-phobic par-
ticipants and a nontreatment control group of nonphobic partici-
pants. Both groups performed four spider-related IATs and two
spider-unrelated control IATs at three intervals: at pretest, at
posttest, and at a two-month follow-up. Results showed that the
afraid–unafraid and the disgusting–appealing IAT effects re-
mained stable from pretest to posttest in the nonphobic control
group but changed significantly in the successfully treated phobic
group. At posttest, these IAT measures no longer differed between
the two groups. Furthermore, these IAT effects remained stable at
the two-month posttherapy follow-up, suggesting that the treat-
ment was successful in decreasing the strength of spider–afraid
and spider–disgust associations.
Although Teachman and Woody (2003) included a nonfearful
control group and two control IATs, the changes observed on the
fear-relevant IATs could still have been the result of testing, not
treatment, effects. Testing effects could arguably be different for
phobic and nonphobic participants. This possibility was addressed
in later treatment studies (Huijding & de Jong, 2007, 2009) that
included: (a) a high-fearful group that received a single session of
exposure, which was successful; (b) a high-fearful delayed-
treatment control group that received treatment after study com-
pletion; and (c) a low-fearful control group. In high-fearful par-
ticipants, implicit measures of spider associations were obtained
either before and after a single session of exposure or before and
after a 2-hr pause (Huijding & de Jong, 2007: two IATs; Huijding
& de Jong, 2009: EAST). The treatment group and the delayed-
treatment control group showed a similar decrease on the IAT
measures from pretest to posttest, suggesting that changes were the
result of test–retest effects rather than being treatment-specific
effects. Although the effect was small at best, the EAST measure
showed a marginally significant treatment-specific reduction of
negative spider associations.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. Most studies
have used a behavioral avoidance task as the to-be-predicted
behavior. In this task, participants are asked to approach a live
spider. The dependent variables of interest are how close and how
fast the participant approaches the spider. Implicit measures of
negative spider associations derived from the IAT (Ellwart et al.,
2006; Teachman & Woody, 2003; but see: Huijding & de Jong,
2007), the pictorial EAST (Huijding & de Jong, 2005b; but see:
Huijding & de Jong, 2009), the go/no-go IAT (Teachman, 2007),
and the approach–avoidance task (Rinck & Becker, 2007) pre-
dicted variance in behavioral avoidance task performance beyond
what was predicted by self-reported spider fear.
Cognitive models of anxiety (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997) and
dual-process models of information processing (e.g., Fazio &
Towles-Schwen, 1999) both propose that implicit and explicit
measures of associations are differentially related to spontaneous
versus more strategically generated fear responses. In line with
this, Huijding and de Jong (2006b) found that whereas a verbal
EAST measure was the main predictor of spontaneous fear re-
sponses (startle reflex), self-reported spider fear was the only
predictor of relatively controllable fear responses (i.e., behavioral
avoidance task performance). Yet, as noted above, other studies
have found associations between implicit measures and behavioral
avoidance task performance (e.g., Teachman & Woody, 2003).
Interpretation of these results will have to await further empirical
clarification.
Summary. Generally, implicit measures have confirmed the
theoretically expected negative associations with spiders. That is,
several implicit measures of spider associations have successfully
differentiated between high and low spider-fearful individuals. In
addition, implicit measures have predicted phobia-related behavior
beyond what explicit measures have predicted and, in one case,
even more so for relatively spontaneous fear responses. Finally,
implicit measures of spider fear-related affective associations have
appeared to be malleable by contextual factors and possibly also
by treatment.
Social Phobia
Table 2 presents results of studies on social phobia. Patients
with social phobia experience significant, enduring fear of social
or performance situations in which they can feel embarrassment
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). From a cognitive per-
spective, symptoms are a result of dysfunctional beliefs regarding
danger of rejection and failure in social situations and a negative
sense of self-esteem (e.g., D. M. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee &
Heimberg, 1997). In support of this view, individuals with social
phobia (a) score higher on self-report measures of fear of negative
evaluation than do healthy and clinical control groups (e.g., He-
imberg, Hope, Rapee, & Bruch, 1988), (b) underestimate the
quality of their social performance (Alden & Wallace, 1995), and
(c) tend to evaluate even positive social situations as threatening
(Alden, Taylor, Mellings, & Laposa, 2008). Therefore, implicit
measures should reflect negative associations with the self and
with social situations. Implicit–explicit correlations ranged from
r  .05 to .41.
Studies comparing groups with a disorder to controls. de
Jong, Pasman, Kindt, and van den Hout (2001) found an IAT
association between social interactions (e.g., date, presentation)
and negative outcomes (e.g., blunder) in socially fearful students.1
However, IAT self-esteem effects were not specific to socially
fearful students, in that both high and low socially fearful students
associated self with positive, although this self-favoring effect was
significantly weaker in the anxious group than in the nonanxious
group (de Jong, 2002).1 Moreover, these results were replicated by



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tanner, Stopa, and De Houwer (2006) when an implicit measure
was obtained after participants gave a speech (note, however, that
they did not contrast this group to either a no-speech premeasure-
ment group or a no-speech control group). In still another study,
high socially anxious individuals had weaker self–calmness asso-
ciations than did low socially anxious individuals (Gamer,
Schmukle, Luka-Krausgrill, & Egloff, 2008). Because social pho-
bia patients are hypervigilant to cues of possible negative evalu-
ations by others, human facial expressions are a particularly im-
portant source of information for them. A study conducted with an
approach–avoidance task found that, as expected, socially fearful
students showed stronger avoidance responses to angry faces but
unexpectedly also showed stronger avoidance responses to smiling
faces than did their counterparts with low social fearfulness. No
differences emerged between these groups in response to neutral
faces or neutral control stimuli (Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007).
Experimental validity studies. Patterns of findings can be
difficult to align with intuition. In one study, scores on an anxiety
IAT (target dimension: self–other; attribute dimension: anxiety–
calmness) did not differ between students expecting compared
with those not expecting to give a speech (Schmukle & Egloff,
2004). Yet, in another study self–calmness associations on a
similar IAT decreased after student participants gave a speech that
was intended as an anxiety induction (Westberg, Lundh, & Jöns-
son, 2007). Possibly expectation was too weak an induction com-
pared with actual performance. In a third study—illustrating the
difficulty in faking responses to the IAT—Egloff and Schmukle
(2002) found that healthy participants who were instructed to make
a good impression for a job application could not manipulate their
anxiety IAT scores and performed virtually identically to control
participants who did not receive specific instructions on how to
perform the IAT.
Consistent with clinical expectations, Gamer et al. (2008) found
that self–calmness associations increased significantly on an IAT
over the course of a successful cognitive–behavioral therapy treat-
ment in high socially anxious individuals. Nonanxious controls,
who did not receive treatment but who were assessed at the same
time points, showed no changes. At posttest, the IAT scores of the
high socially anxious individuals no longer differed from those of
the low socially anxious individuals. Although encouraging in
terms of the use of implicit measures to evaluate treatment effi-
cacy, it is unclear whether this effect can be attributed to repeated
testing, because this study did not include a waiting-list control
group.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. Egloff and
Schmukle (2002; Study 3) found that, following a stress task, an
anxiety IAT was predictive of change in cognitive performance
and experimenter-rated state anxiety over and above explicit mea-
sures. Moreover, a follow-up experiment showed that this IAT
measure was also predictive of four of five behavioral indicators of
anxiety (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002, Study 4).
Summary. Findings are partly consistent with explicit dys-
functional beliefs, but the pattern does not display the desired
consistency. More comprehensive studies will be needed to deter-
mine how effective implicit measures are in the context of social
phobia, both in terms of identifying affected individuals and in
terms of measuring the influence of treatment.
Panic Disorder
Table 3 presents results of studies on panic disorder. Panic
attacks are discrete periods of rapidly occurring or escalating fear
or discomfort accompanied by a number of somatic and cognitive
symptoms, such as palpitations, sweating, trembling, shortness of
breath, and fears of dying or losing control. Individuals with panic
disorder suffer from recurrent panic attacks and show persistent
worry about future attacks and the consequences of such attacks
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). A cognitive perspective
on panic assigns a crucial role to the misinterpretation of bodily
sensations as indicating catastrophic consequences in the onset and
maintenance of the disorder (e.g., D. M. Clark, 1986). Indeed,
patients with panic disorder are more likely to interpret ambiguous
bodily sensations as threatening than are healthy and clinical
control groups (e.g., D. M. Clark et al., 1997; Rosmarin, Bourque,
Antony, & McCabe, 2009). Implicit measures are expected to
reflect associations between the self and panic, indicating a panic
self-schema (Teachman, 2005), and between bodily sensations and
catastrophic outcomes (D. M. Clark, 1986). Research on implicit–
explicit correspondence is limited and correlations range from r 
.24 to r  .37.
Studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls.
Two groups—students scoring high on a self-report measure of
anxiety sensitivity (Teachman, 2005) and patients diagnosed with
panic disorder (Teachman, Smith-Janik, & Saporito, 2007)—
showed weaker IAT calm–me associations than did healthy control
participants. Also supporting cognitive theories, using a semantic
priming paradigm,2 Schneider and Schulte (2007) reported that
patients with panic disorder reacted faster to catastrophic target
words (e.g., “heart attack”) following panic-related primes describ-
ing bodily sensations (e.g., “I feel dizzy”) than did healthy control
participants. Unexpectedly, however, no parallel group differences
were found in IAT bodily changes–alarming associations (Teach-
man, 2005, 2007).
Experimental validity studies. Over the course of a 12-week
program of cognitive–behavior therapy, the strength of IAT
calm–me associations increased in panic disorder patients. A self-
report measure of panic disorder severity showed corresponding
reductions. Moreover, additional prospective analyses showed that
IAT change scores were predictive of later changes in panic
disorder severity, but not the other way around. This outcome
suggests that the cognitive change assessed by the IAT precedes
panic disorder symptom reduction (Teachman, Marker, & Smith-
Janik, 2008).
Incremental and predictive validity studies. Structural
modeling has shown an IAT measure of calmness associations to
be a unique predictor of panic symptoms (Teachman et al., 2007).
A priming measure of associations between panic-related bodily
sensations and catastrophic interpretations predicted the degree to
which anxiety sensitivity decreased over the course of a single
2 Although the semantic priming paradigm is not one of the measure-
ment procedures included in this review, some highly relevant semantic
priming studies are included. The difference between a semantic and an
affective priming task is that the focus of the semantic priming paradigm
is on the meaningful relation between a type of prime and a type of target,
whereas in affective priming the focus is on the emotional associations
between the primes and targets (De Houwer, 2003a).







































































































session of cognitive intervention, independent of what was pre-
dicted by an explicit measure of catastrophic cognitions. That is,
the stronger the priming effect of panic-related bodily sensations
for catastrophic targets, the less was the reduction in anxiety
sensitivity during the single treatment session (Schneider &
Schulte, 2008).
Other Anxiety Disorders
Table 4 presents results of studies on other anxiety disorders.
Two relevant studies were conducted on obsessive–compulsive
disorder (OCD) and one on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
OCD is characterized by the occurrence and recurrence of persis-
tent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced as intrusive
and inappropriate (obsessions) and/or repetitive behaviors aimed at
preventing or neutralizing feared events (compulsions) (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). On the basis of early research on
obsessions (Rachman & De Silva, 1978), cognitive models of
OCD (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985) ascribe the major dif-
ference between healthy people and OCD patients not to the
specific content of intrusive thoughts but to a dysfunctional inter-
pretation of their meaning. Indeed, patients suffering from OCD
interpret obsessive thoughts as signs that they are immoral, evil,
and dangerous (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working
Group, 2001, 2003).
PTSD patients suffer from re-experiencing an extremely trau-
matic event, avoidance of stimuli related to the trauma, and in-
creased arousal (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). It is
thought that both pre- and posttrauma dysfunctional beliefs con-
cerning the self, the world, and the future play a major role in the
development of PTSD, and it is hypothesized that extreme beliefs
about one’s own vulnerability are associated with the development
of PTSD symptoms (Engelhard, Huijding, van den Hout, & de
Jong, 2007). Thus, according to some cognitive models, OCD
patients might be expected to associate the self with immoral and
dangerous, and unwanted thoughts with important, whereas PTSD
patients would be expected to associate the self with either very
high or very low vulnerability on implicit measures. Research on
implicit–explicit correspondence is limited, and correlations for
OCD and PTSD hover around zero (for OCD, rs range from .18
to .17, and for PTSD, rs range from .00 to .13).
Studies comparing groups with a disorder to controls. In
student participants, the strength of self-reported OCD symptoms
was not related to IAT measures of the associations self–danger,
self–immoral, and unwanted thought–important (Teachman &
Clerkin, 2007; Teachman, Woody, & Magee, 2006). With regard
to PTSD, a curvilinear relation was expected between PTSD
symptom severity and IAT self–(in)vulnerability associations.
However, the strength of clinician-rated PTSD symptoms in sol-
diers showed a linear relation such that more severe PTSD symp-
toms were linked to weaker self–invulnerable associations (En-
gelhard et al., 2007). Thus, the picture emerging from these studies
is not consistent with the proposed cognitive theories of these
disorders.
Experimental validity studies. Manipulation of beliefs
about the importance of intrusive thoughts (important vs. mean-
ingless vs. no information) in an OCD study increased IAT un-
wanted thought–important associations but had no effect on self–











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OCD symptoms before the manipulation were more sensitive to
information that unwanted thoughts are important and thus more
likely to show an increase in self–danger associations in that
condition (Teachman et al., 2006). A subsequent study (Teachman
& Clerkin, 2007) showed that manipulation of beliefs about the
moral significance of intrusive thoughts also had no effect on IAT
measures of associations. However, structural modeling showed
that higher self-reported intolerance of uncertainty before the ma-
nipulation was associated with greater decreases in self–danger
and self–immoral associations in the group that was told that
intrusive thoughts are meaningless. In addition, participants who
reported prior to the manipulation that unwanted thoughts were
highly important were more sensitive to the instruction that intru-
sive thoughts are morally significant (as evidenced by their ten-
dency to show stronger associations of unwanted-thoughts–
important on the IAT).
Incremental and predictive validity studies. One study on
PTSD obtained IAT measures of self–vulnerability associations
before deployment to Iraq and five months after deployment.
These measures were not predictive of PTSD symptoms assessed
15 months after deployment (Engelhard et al., 2007).
Depressive Disorder
Table 5 presents results of studies on depressive disorder. A
major depressive episode is a period of at least two weeks during
which the patient either suffers from a depressed mood or has no
interest or pleasure in almost all activities (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). According to a cognitive perspective on de-
pression, the view of the self, the world, and the future is nega-
tively biased in depressed patients (Beck et al., 1979; D. A. Clark
et al., 1999). This has been confirmed in several studies with
self-report measures of such dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., Hollon,
Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; Silverman, Silverman, & Eardley, 1984).
According to this notion, implicit measures are expected to display
negative associations with the self. Implicit–explicit correlations
range from r .41 to r  .25.
Studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls.
In contrast to theoretical expectations, several studies conducted
with an IAT found evidence for positive self-esteem both in
depressed patients and in healthy controls (De Raedt, Schacht,
Franck, & De Houwer, 2006; Franck, De Raedt, & De Houwer,
2008; Franck, De Raedt, Dereu, & Van den Abbeele, 2007; Gemar,
Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001). An EAST measure of self-
esteem was even more positive in depressed patients than it was in
healthy controls (De Raedt et al., 2006). Somewhat consistent with
cognitive theory, in two IAT studies, these positive self associa-
tions were smaller in former depressed patients (Meites, Deveney,
Steele, Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 2008) and in students at high risk of
becoming depressed (Steinberg, Karpinski, & Alloy, 2007) than in
healthy controls. In addition, IAT self-esteem was neutral in a
subgroup of depressed patients without suicidal ideation (Franck et
al., 2007).
Experimental validity studies. Gemar et al. (2001) used an
IAT to measure self-esteem before and after a negative mood
induction in healthy controls and formerly depressed individuals.
In an atypical analysis (see De Houwer, 2002), Gemar et al.
eliminated the attribute trials and analyzed me and not-me trials
separately, their goal being to have separate indices of associations
with me and not-me. Whereas the me category was associated with
positive, the not-me category was associated with negative. More-
over, the negative mood induction only reduced the positive bias in
the me trials in formerly depressed individuals, not in healthy
controls. The differential effectiveness of the mood induction may
be explained by the exceptionally elevated me–positive bias pre-
mood induction in the formerly depressed participants who took
part in this study.
Using standard IAT analysis procedures, Franck et al. (2008)
replicated this exact result pattern. These researchers suggested
that the higher self-esteem of the formerly depressed participants
before mood induction could function as a buffer against threats to
self-esteem. This idea, although provocative, seems to be contra-
dicted by a study by Meites et al. (2008), in which a mood
induction procedure reduced me–happy associations only in
healthy controls, not in formerly depressed participants. Critically,
in this study, formerly depressed participants did not show in-
creased me–happy associations prior to the mood induction.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. In line with the
dual-process models of information processing described earlier,
Haeffel et al. (2007) found that an IAT measure of self-esteem
interacted with the presence of an experimentally induced stressor
to predict immediate affective reactions. Participants with lower
implicit measures of self-esteem, when in the stressor condition,
reported the highest immediate distress score. Moreover, an ex-
plicit measure of cognitive style interacted with a measure of
stressful life events to predict depressive symptoms at a five-week
follow-up: Participants with a negative cognitive style who re-
ported more stressful life events also reported experiencing the
most depressive symptoms. Correspondingly, Steinberg et al.
(2007) found that the occurrence of negative events predicted
depressive symptoms four months later in participants at risk for
depression, but only when the implicit measure of self-esteem was
relatively negative.
Summary. Unexpectedly, depressed individuals consistently
were not characterized by negative implicit measures of self-
esteem. This provocative outcome warrants further attention. A
mood induction influenced IAT results, but evidence was equivo-
cal regarding which group (healthy controls or formerly depressed
participants) showed this effect and whether the effect resulted
from elevated pre-induction IAT scores. Nonetheless, an IAT
measure was predictive (in interaction with a stress manipulation)
of the occurrence of depressive symptoms and immediate affective
reactions.
Body Dysmorphic Disorder
Table 6 presents results of studies on body dysmorphic disorder
(BDD). Patients suffering from BDD are preoccupied with either
an imagined defect or a slight anomaly in their appearance (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2000). According to an influential
cognitive–behavioral model of BDD (Veale, 2004), BDD patients
misinterpret normal bodily features or minor appearance flaws,
leading to excessive rumination, anxiety, and body checking.
These patients are thought to have a distorted view of their own
attractiveness and to hold dysfunctional beliefs about the impor-
tance of attractiveness. Thus, BDD patients, for example, hold the
belief, “If my appearance is defective, I shall end up alone and
isolated” (Veale et al., 1996). In addition, they have been shown to


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































have a lower level of self-esteem (Biby, 1998). Accordingly,
implicit measures should reflect positive associations between
attractiveness and importance and negative associations with the
self. Research on implicit–explicit correspondence is limited, and
correlations range from r  .02 to .48.
Studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls.
One study involving BDD patients found evidence for less positive
self-esteem on an IAT, as compared with healthy controls (Buhl-
mann, Teachman, Gerbershagen, Kikul, & Rief, 2008). However,
another study, involving BDD symptomatic students rather than
actual patients, failed to produce this same pattern (Clerkin &
Teachman, 2009). To date, no IAT study has found evidence of
increased importance of attractiveness in BDD patients (Buhlmann
et al., 2008; Clerkin & Teachman, 2009), so progress in this realm
has been minimal thus far.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. Despite this
absence of evidence for an attractiveness–importance link, an IAT
measure of the importance of attractiveness did predict behavioral
avoidance of a mirror: Students who showed stronger IAT
attractiveness–importance associations positioned themselves far-
ther away from a mirror in the laboratory. Interestingly, explicit
measures assessing the importance of attractiveness failed to pre-
dict this behavior (Clerkin & Teachman, 2009).
Summary. There is minimal evidence that BDD patients are
characterized by reduced self-esteem. One limitation that needs to
be addressed is that many studies probably have examined patient
groups with comorbidities (e.g., depressive symptoms), thereby
complicating any conclusions by what amounts to disorder con-
founds. Of course, this criticism applies not just to BDD.
Pain Disorder
Table 7 presents results of studies on pain disorder. Patients with
pain disorder present with pain that is of sufficient severity to
warrant clinical attention (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). Psychological factors are seen as playing a major role in the
pain symptoms (Linton, 2000). According to a cognitive perspec-
tive, appraisals and beliefs about pain have a large impact on
emotional and behavioral responses to pain (Gatchel, Peng, Peters,
Fuchs, & Turk, 2007). Numerous studies have demonstrated that
catastrophic thoughts concerning pain (e.g., “pain is the worst
thing that could ever happen to me”) are associated with increased
pain and increased disability in both clinical and nonclinical pop-
ulations (for a review, see Keefe, Rumble, Scipio, Giordano, &
Perri, 2004). In addition, pain disorder patients report avoidance of
activities that they think will worsen their pain (Vlaeyen, Kole-
Snijders, Boeren, & van Eek, 1995). Accordingly, implicit mea-
sures should reflect association between the self and pain, as well
as negative and threat-related associations with pain-inducing ac-
tivities and with pain itself. Research on implicit–explicit corre-
spondence is limited and correlations range from r  .24 to .40.
Studies comparing groups with a disorder to controls.
Goubert, Crombez, Hermans, and Vanderstraeten (2003) com-
pared patients who had low back pain with healthy individuals.
Unexpectedly, in the APP, only the healthy participants showed
negative associations with activities that stress the back as com-
pared with low-threat movements. Patients with low back pain
actually showed a relatively positive association with back-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































two tasks—both a go/no-go IAT and an EAST—no evidence
emerged for associations between back-stressing activities and
threat, either in patients with low back pain or in healthy controls
(Leeuw et al., 2007).
In contrast, somewhat in line with expectations, Vancleef, Pe-
ters, Gilissen, and de Jong (2007) found stronger associations
using the EAST for both panic and pain to threat than for either of
these terms to neutral in a sample of healthy participants with
varying degrees of anxiety and injury sensitivity. However, these
EAST associations were not linked with anxiety sensitivity or
injury sensitivity. Yet, in a second EAST study (Vancleef et al.,
2007), pain-related stimuli were more strongly associated with
threat than with safe, an effect that this time was positively
correlated with injury sensitivity and anxiety sensitivity, but the
latter relation only approached statistical significance. In addition,
also to a certain extent in line with expectations, an IAT measure
of associations between me–other and pain–free of pain did dis-
tinguish between chronic pain patients and healthy control partic-
ipants. Patients had weaker me–free of pain associations than did
healthy control participants (Grumm, Erbe, von Collani, & Nestler,
2008).
Experimental validity studies and incremental and predic-
tive validity studies. In line with expectations, IAT self–free of
pain associations increased over the course of a four-week psy-
chotherapy program in a sample of chronic pain patients (Grumm
et al., 2008). Healthy control participants, who did not receive
treatment but who were assessed at the same time intervals,
showed no changes. At posttest, the IAT scores of the chronic pain
patients no longer differed from the IAT scores of the healthy
control participants. Unexpectedly, though, in another study,
which included anxiety sensitivity and injury sensitivity in the
model, pain–threat associations (as measured by the EAST) did not
explain additional variance in either health-protecting behavior or
use of health care services (Vancleef et al., 2007).
Sexual Disorders
Table 8 presents results of studies on sexual disorders. Only two
studies obtained implicit measures in the context of sexual disor-
ders, both fitting into the category of studies comparing groups
having a disorder with controls. The first study focused on pedo-
philia. Individuals with pedophilia repeatedly experience strong
sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving
sexual activity with children who have not yet reached puberty
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Therefore, it is ex-
pected that implicit measures would show associations between
children and sex. Gray, Brown, MacCulloch, Smith, and Snowden
(2005) obtained implicit measures of associations in pedophilia,
with the rationale that such individuals ordinarily are motivated to
hide their sexual preferences. The participants of that study
showed a stronger IAT association between sex and children than
between sex and adults, whereas other-offender control partici-
pants showed evidence of the opposite association. In addition, the
IAT score was somewhat successful in predicting group member-
ship: With an IAT effect of 0 as the threshold for classification,
78% of the pedophilic individuals were correctly identified (but
42% of the other-offender control participants were misclassified
as pedophiles). For pedophilia, implicit–explicit correspondence























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The other relevant study (Brauer, de Jong, Huijding, Laan, & ter
Kuile, 2009) focused on dyspareunia. Patients with dyspareunia
experience genital pain during sexual intercourse (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2000). According to a cognitive perspective,
fear of pain results in sexual problems (Barlow, 1986). In line with
this, women with dyspareunia reported more negative affect than
control women when presented with erotic stimuli either with or
without the threat of pain (Brauer, ter Kuile, Jansen, & Laan,
2007). Therefore, implicit measures would be expected to reflect
negative associations with sexual stimuli. In fact, women with and
without dyspareunia did not differ in implicit measures of affective
reactions to sexual stimuli: Both groups displayed positive asso-
ciations with sexual stimuli (Brauer et al., 2009). For dyspareunia,
no evidence was found for implicit–explicit correspondence (r not
specified).
Eating Disorders
Table 9 presents results of studies on eating disorders. The two
best known eating disorders are anorexia nervosa and bulimia
nervosa. Patients with anorexia nervosa refuse to maintain a min-
imally healthy body weight, are afraid of gaining weight, and have
a disturbed body image. Patients with bulimia nervosa suffer from
eating binges and use inappropriate compensation methods such as
purging; they also overvalue the importance of body shape and
weight (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Insights into
bulimia can be gleaned from studying people who lack the full-
blown disorder but who suffer from restrained eating or obesity.
Like bulimic patients, restrained eaters “exhibit periods of restraint
punctuated by episodes of disinhibited overeating” (Heatherton,
Herman, Polivy, King, & McGree, 1988, p. 19). A substantial
number of obese people also suffer from eating binges (Bruce &
Agras, 1992; de Zwaan & Mitchell, 1992). Restrained eating has
been hypothesized to be related to a perception of high-caloric
foods—often forbidden in diets—as being extra desirable (Gendall
& Joyce, 2001; Stice, 2002), consistent with a large literature
suggesting that the consumption of a high-fat diet plays a major
role in obesity (e.g., Bray & Popkin, 1998; Jéquier, 2002). Indeed,
obese people report a preference for high-fat foods (Gerding &
Weinstein, 1992; Rissanen et al., 2002), and restrained eaters have
been found to fail regularly and to indulge in exactly those high-fat
palatable foods that they normally consider forbidden (Herman &
Polivy, 2004).
Patients with bulimia, restrained eaters, and obese people would
all therefore be expected to show strong positive implicit measures
of associations with high-fat palatable foods. For anorexic patients,
on the other hand, high-fat foods are hypothesized to have lost
their incentive value (Jansen, 1998, 2001; Pinel, Assanand, &
Lehman, 2000). In support of this, anorexic patients of the restrict-
ing type reported a reduced desire for high-fat foods (Stoner,
Fedoroff, Andersen, & Rolls, 1996). Therefore, for anorexic pa-
tients, implicit measures of associations with high-fat palatable
foods would be expected to be strongly negative. For obesity and
restrained eating, implicit–explicit correlations range from r  .02
to .44; implicit–explicit correspondence has not been studied for
anorexia.
Studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls
Obesity. Contrary to expectation, both obese participants and
healthy-weight controls showed more negative associations with
high-fat foods than with low-fat foods on an IAT. This effect was
more pronounced in obese people (Roefs & Jansen, 2002) and was
stronger with increased reported dieting activity (Maison, Green-
wald, & Bruin, 2001; Roefs & Jansen, 2002). These findings might
be partially explained by the high-fat versus low-fat category
labels, which might have made fat content salient and thereby
elicited associations based on health concerns rather than palat-
ability. But this explanation is insufficient because similar results
were found in a study using the APP, a paradigm that does not
require sorting of target stimuli into predefined categories. Regard-
less of weight status, all participants showed more positive asso-
ciations with low-fat palatable foods than with high-fat palatable
foods (Roefs, Stapert, et al., 2005). Providing further evidence for
the idea that automatic associations are based on health concerns,
Werrij et al. (2009) found, using a semantic priming paradigm,2
that both obese participants and healthy-weight controls associated
palatable high-fat foods with restraint rather than with disinhibi-
tion).
Studies of obese children also yielded no evidence for positive
associations with high-fat palatable foods. Obese children showed
positive associations with both healthy and unhealthy foods on an
EAST; for lean children, the effect was suggestive of neutral
associations with both types of foods. Analyses of percentage of
errors resulted in a different pattern, however, suggesting that all
of the children had positive associations with healthy foods and
neutral associations with unhealthy foods (Craeynest et al., 2005).
A study conducted with a personalized version of the IAT (Olson
& Fazio, 2004) produced evidence corroborating these latter EAST
results: Both obese and lean children had more positive associa-
tions with healthy foods than with unhealthy foods. In addition, on
another personalized IAT, both obese children and healthy controls
showed no differential positive associations with palatable foods
as compared with hobbies (Craeynest, Crombez, Haerens, & De
Bourdeaudhuij, 2007). However, one study contrasts with all of
these studies suggesting that obese children do not show the
expected associations. Craeynest, Crombez, De Houwer, De-
forche, and De Bourdeaudhuij (2006) used a self-concept IAT to
assess associations between self and high-fat foods and did find
that lean children were more likely to associate themselves with
nonfat foods than with high-fat foods. Obese children showed no
such difference.
Restrained eating. Also in disagreement with theoretical ex-
pectations, Vartanian, Polivy, and Herman (2004) found that high-
restrained eaters showed more negative IAT associations with
high-fat foods than did low-restrained eaters. In further work with
the APP and the EAST, participants showed a preference for
palatable over unpalatable foods independent of their restraint
status and the fat content of the stimuli (Roefs, Herman, MacLeod,
Smulders, & Jansen, 2005). However, on an EAST that included
stimuli directly referring to caloric content (e.g., deep fried vs.
steamed), instead of simply using food items as stimuli, restrained
eaters showed stronger positive associations with high-caloric con-
tent than did unrestrained eaters (Hoefling & Strack, 2008).
Somewhat in line with expectations, on a version of the
stimulus–response compatibility task in which instructions focused
on a feature not typically relevant to food, rather than on the food
stimuli themselves (i.e., approach pictures photographed from
above, avoid pictures photographed from the side), high restrained
eaters displayed a stronger approach tendency toward both high-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































caloric and low-caloric foods than did low restrained eaters (de
Jong & Veenstra, 2007). In line with this approach tendency,
Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, Schut, and Kruglanski (2008) found that
restrained eaters inhibited thoughts of weight control upon the
presentation of “eating enjoyment” primes in a semantic priming
paradigm. After neutral primes, restrained eaters were faster than
unrestrained eaters in identifying weight-control targets. Yet quite
opposite results emerged from a study using an approach-
avoidance task in which instructions to avoid or approach were
based on whether the presented stimulus was or was not food.
Dieters (selected based on the question: “Do you sometimes diet
(yes or no)?,” which correlated r  .44 with scores on the Restraint
Scale) exhibited the ambivalent response of equally approaching
and avoiding fattening food stimuli, unlike non-dieters, who ex-
hibited approach responses toward fattening foods (Fishbach &
Shah, 2006).
Undereating. In line with theoretical expectations (e.g.,
Jansen, 1998, 2001), whereas healthy controls showed more pos-
itive APP associations with palatable than with unpalatable foods,
AN patients showed no such priming effect (Roefs, Stapert, et al.,
2005). Also in line with expectations, later research suggested that
associations with food stimuli in AN patients may depend on
caloric content. AN patients showed more positive associations
with low-caloric foods and more negative associations with high-
caloric food on an affective Simon task, as compared to healthy
controls (de Jong & Veenstra, 2007). These results were partly
paralleled in results on a stimulus–response compatibility task in
which response selection was based on a feature of the stimulus
not typically relevant to food. Anorexic patients displayed a re-
duced approach response toward both high-caloric and low-caloric
foods in comparison with healthy controls (de Jong & Veenstra,
2007).
It is possible that patients with anorexia immediately associate
tempting food with the dieting goal instead of with taste. Some
studies have investigated the association between tempting foods
and the goal of dieting, using a word–word semantic priming
paradigm2 (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). Results
showed that participants who valued weight control and who were
successful self-regulators were faster to recognize diet-related tar-
gets after the presentation of a tempting food prime, suggesting
that presentation of temptations activated the goal of dieting (for a
conceptual replication, see Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2008). To
complicate the picture, however, similar findings have been ob-
tained for unsuccessful dieters: They also associated high-caloric
foods with restraint (Werrij et al., 2009).
Experimental validity studies. Roefs et al. (2006) specifically
tested the role of context in food associations. In their first study,
they manipulated the attention focus of obese and healthy-weight
participants prior to performing an APP. Participants were focused
either on the palatability of food or on the negative health conse-
quences of eating fattening foods. In the palatability condition,
participants showed more positive associations with high-fat and
palatable foods; in the health condition, participants showed more
positive associations with low-fat and unpalatable foods. Weight
status (obese vs. healthy weight) did not influence these effects. In
Roefs et al.’s second study, the level of craving was manipulated.
For obese people, the level of initially experienced craving corre-
lated positively with the palatability priming effect (i.e., with




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with palatable foods than with unpalatable foods). This correlation
was not significant for a healthy-weight control group. Converging
with the results of the craving manipulation, further studies found
that food deprivation elicited more positive associations with food
on both an IAT and an EAST and more approach responses in both
healthy participants and patients with eating disorder (Hoefling &
Strack, 2008; Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007; Stafford & Schef-
fler, 2008).
One study investigated the question of whether implicit mea-
sures of eating associations change as a result of treatment (Craey-
nest, Crombez, Deforche, Tanghe, & De Bourdeaudhuij, 2008).
After a 12-month weight-loss treatment program in which obese
children successfully achieved weight reduction, there was no
change in implicit measures of associations with food and physical
activity. Yet, greater weight reduction was related to more positive
associations with healthy foods. On the other hand (and unexpect-
edly), these investigators found a relation between greater weight
reduction and more negative associations with physical activity.
Possibly, obese children who lost more weight became fed up with
physical exercise, although we note that this study used only a
small sample.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. The outcome of
a naming variant of the APP was predictive of food-choice behav-
ior (Snickers candy bar vs. apple), whereas this was not the case
for the evaluative categorization variant of the APP and the stan-
dard IAT (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004; Spruyt,
Hermans, De Houwer, Vandekerckhove, & Eelen, 2007). How-
ever, an IAT measure did prove to be predictive of food choice
when participants chose between the general categories of snacks
and fruits (Perugini, 2005; Richetin, Perugini, Prestwich, &
O’Gorman, 2007). A personalized IAT was found to be predictive
of behavioral intention and past eating behavior (Olson & Fazio,
2004).
In a series of experiments, Hofmann and colleagues showed that
the prediction of eating behavior may depend critically on several
moderating variables. A first moderator that they studied was the
amount of self-regulatory resources (Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawron-
ski, 2007; see also Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008, Study 2). In
half of the participants, an emotion-suppression task temporarily
depleted self-regulatory resources (depletion condition), whereas
the other half of the participants were allowed to express their
emotions normally (control condition). When self-regulation re-
sources were low, a more positive SC-IAT measure of candy
associations was related to greater consumption of candy. Such an
association was not observed in the control condition.
Other studies on moderation found evidence corroborating that
implicit measures are only predictive of eating behavior when
resources are limited. These studies have varied in how they
manipulated cognitive resources, and moderators include alcohol
consumption (Hofmann & Friese, 2008), cognitive capacity
(Friese et al., 2008), working-memory capacity (Hofmann, Gsch-
wendner, Wiers, Friese, & Schmitt, 2008), executive attention,
inhibitory control, and affect regulation (Hofmann, Friese, &
Roefs, 2009). In addition, implicit measures were predictive of
eating behavior, with increased self-reported habit strength (Con-
ner, Perugini, O’Gorman, Ayres, & Prestwich, 2007) and with
self-activation (i.e., activation of self-related knowledge; Perugini,
O’Gorman, & Prestwich, 2007).
Considering overeaters’ implicit measures of food associations
and context effects (i.e., attention, craving, deprivation), the over-
consumption of high-caloric foods may be driven jointly by trait-
and state-positive associations with these foods, with the predictive
validity of these implicit measures depending on moderator vari-
ables. Although obese people and restrained eaters did not display
consistently more positive associations with high-fat foods, they
may find themselves more frequently in situations in which the
sensory aspects of food are emphasized, resulting in positive
associations with high-caloric foods. This once again highlights
the importance of contextual influences not only on explicit but
also on implicit measures.
Summary. Evidence was equivocal for the idea that obese
people and restrained eaters are characterized by stronger positive
associations with high-caloric foods relative to normal, healthy
eaters. Overeaters are almost certainly aware of the negative as-
pects of tempting high-caloric foods, which may have influenced
their implicit measures of food associations. In line with expecta-
tions, food associations in anorexic patients were more negative
than in healthy controls. Level of craving, hunger, and focus of
attention (i.e., palatability vs. health) influenced implicit measures.
However, implicit measures of associations with food and physical
activity did not change over the course of a successful weight-
reduction treatment. Finally, implicit measures were mostly pre-
dictive of eating behavior when cognitive resources were limited,
an intriguing finding worthy of further exploration.
Alcohol Use Disorders
Table 10 presents the results of studies on alcohol use disorders.
Individuals with alcohol use disorders (subcategories of alcohol
abuse and dependence) continue to drink alcohol despite signifi-
cant alcohol-related problems (American Psychiatric Association,
2000). Alcohol-related expectancies—defined as anticipated out-
comes of drinking (e.g., “drinking alcohol makes me more spon-
taneous”)—have featured prominently in alcohol research (see
Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999; Jones, Corbin, & Fromme,
2001). Although the term dysfunctional beliefs is not used in this
expectancy framework, expectancies arguably can be thought of as
having a similar role to dysfunctional beliefs. Studies using mul-
tidimensional scaling have shown that these expectancies can be
grouped not only as either positive or negative but also as relating
to either arousal or sedation (Goldman et al., 1999; Rather, Gold-
man, Roehrich, & Brannick, 1992). Typically, the expectancies of
heavy drinkers reflect a combination of positive affect and arousal,
whereas those of light drinkers reflect a combination of positive
affect and sedation (Goldman et al., 1999). Research with implicit
measures therefore has focused on both valence and arousal asso-
ciations. Implicit–explicit correlations range from r  .36 to .66.
Studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls.
Rather than specifying predefined groups (e.g., heavy vs. light
drinkers) to study disorder-relevant associations, some studies
have related the implicit measures of associations to a continuous
measure of self-reported drinking behavior or alcohol-related
problems, which is conceptually similar to comparing predefined
groups. Associations between alcohol and positive/negative va-
lence have been studied repeatedly, either contrasting negative
with positive (e.g., Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, & de Jong,
2002) or assessing the two affective dimensions separately (e.g.,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). A bipolar IAT contrasting alcohol
versus soft drinks as positive versus negative in different sam-
ples—a randomly selected community sample (Houben & Wiers,
2009), a sample of heavy and light drinkers (Wiers et al., 2002;
Wiers, van de Luitgaarden, van den Wildenberg, & Smulders,
2005), a sample of students varying in drinking behavior (Houben
& Wiers, 2006b), and a sample of alcohol-dependent patients (De
Houwer, Crombez, Koster, & De Beul, 2004)—unexpectedly
showed stronger negative associations with alcohol than with soft
drinks. Less negative alcohol associations on the bipolar IAT were
correlated with increased self-reported drinking and alcohol prob-
lems (Houben & Wiers, 2009).
The observed unexpected negative associations with alcohol
may be partly explained by extrapersonal associations, most nota-
bly cultural knowledge about associations, knowledge that may not
reflect one’s own opinion. Such associations are known to affect
IAT performance (Olson & Fazio, 2004; but see Nosek & Hansen,
2008) but may be addressed with a personalized version of the
bipolar IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Compared with the traditional
IAT, studies using this personalized IAT have found that drinking
students showed less negative associations with alcohol as com-
pared with the traditional IAT (Houben & Wiers, 2007b) or even
positive associations with alcohol (Houben & Wiers, 2007a).
Another way to better understand the unexpected negative im-
plicit measures of alcohol associations is to separate the positive/
negative dimension in unipolar IATs into positive–neutral and
negative–neutral. When this is done, alcohol is related to both
positive and negative valence in student samples (Houben &
Wiers, 2006a; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003). One study found
stronger negative than positive associations (Houben & Wiers,
2006a), whereas another found evidence only for negative associ-
ations (Houben & Wiers, 2008a). Greater positive unipolar IAT
associations were related to more self-reported drinking (Houben
& Wiers, 2008a; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003; McCarthy &
Thompsen, 2006) and to more alcohol problems (Houben & Wiers,
2008a) but not consistently (Houben & Wiers, 2006a; Jajodia &
Earleywine, 2003). Only one study found negative unipolar IAT
associations to be related to less self-reported alcohol use and
problems (Thush et al., 2007).
In studies involving the unipolar single-category IAT (SC-IAT),
separate assessment of positive and negative dimensions is re-
tained, but the comparison category (e.g., soft drinks) is omitted.
Student participants showed both positive and negative associa-
tions with alcohol on unipolar SC-IATs (Houben & Wiers, 2008a),
but elevated self-reported drinking and alcohol problems were
related only to the magnitude of positive SC-IAT associations.
These effects were replicated and extended to associations with
beer, because the alcohol category may have more negative cul-
tural connotations than does the instance of beer. Positive and
negative associations with both alcohol and beer were found.
However, in this study, elevated self-reported drinking was related
only to the magnitude of positive unipolar beer SC-IAT (Houben
& Wiers, 2009). A different pattern of results was found for
adolescents, who have less experience with drinking alcohol than
do adults. Fifteen-year-old drinkers were both more positive and
less negative toward alcohol than were abstainers, whereas no
differences were found between 12-year-old drinkers and abstain-
ers (Thush & Wiers, 2007).
The EAST, like the SC-IAT, also obviates the need for a
contrast category. On EAST measures of alcohol associations,
alcohol-dependent patients (De Houwer et al., 2004) and both light
and heavy drinkers (de Jong, Wiers, van de Braak, & Huijding,
2007) showed positive associations with soft drinks, whereas al-
cohol was associated equally with positive and negative. Thus, the
relatively negative associations with alcohol as compared with soft
drinks on bipolar IAT measures (De Houwer et al., 2004; Wiers et
al., 2002) may have been caused by positive associations with soft
drinks rather than by negative associations with alcohol. In the
ID-EAST, heavy drinkers had more positive associations with beer
than did light drinkers (De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007). The
existence of both positive and negative associations with alcohol
on EAST, unipolar IAT, and SC-IAT measures (e.g., Houben &
Wiers, 2008a; Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003) could suggest an
ambivalent attitude toward alcohol, which is also evident on ex-
plicit measures (Conner & Sparks, 2002).
Because approach is related to positive valence and avoidance,
to negative valence, performance on these tasks is theorized to
reflect affective associations. An APP study with alcohol and
neutral words as primes and approach and avoidance words as
targets found that an index of avoidance motivation—but not of
approach motivation—was negatively related to the frequency of
binge episodes and alcohol-related problems (Ostafin, Palfai, &
Wechsler, 2003). Thus, the fewer binge episodes and alcohol-
related problems that were reported, the stronger was the avoid-
ance motivation. IAT effects depended heavily on the contrast
category that was used. When alcohol was contrasted with elec-
tricity, at-risk drinkers associated alcohol more strongly with ap-
proach than with avoidance (Palfai & Ostafin 2003b); when alco-
hol was contrasted with water, at-risk drinkers associated alcohol
more strongly with avoidance than with approach (Ostafin &
Palfai, 2006), and when alcohol was contrasted with soft drinks, no
difference was found between alcohol–approach and alcohol–
avoid associations in a group of heavy drinkers (van den Wilden-
berg, Beckers, van Lambaart, Conrod, & Wiers, 2006). More in
line with expectations, stronger IAT approach associations corre-
lated positively with binge drinking in the past month (Ostafin &
Palfai, 2006; Palfai & Ostafin, 2003b), quantity of drinking per
occasion (but see Ostafin & Palfai, 2006), difficulty controlling
alcohol use, and greater sensitivity to positive incentives (Palfai &
Ostafin, 2003b).
Approach and avoidance tendencies have also been assessed
with a stimulus–response compatibility task. Social drinkers scor-
ing high on a subjective measure of alcohol craving showed
stronger alcohol–approach tendencies compared with those scor-
ing low on the craving measure (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005a).
In line with these findings, heavy drinkers showed approach ten-
dencies toward alcohol, whereas light drinkers did not. Moreover,
this approach bias was significantly related to weekly alcohol
consumption and to a measure of alcohol problems (Field, Kier-
nan, Eastwood, & Child, 2008). Finally, another approach–
avoidance study tested associations with alcohol, general appeti-
tive stimuli, and general positive and negative stimuli in heavy
drinkers (Wiers, Rinck, Dictus, & van den Wildenberg, 2009).
This study also examined moderation by the OPRM1 gene because
carriers of the g-allele of this gene have previously been found to
demonstrate relatively strong cue-induced craving for alcohol (Ray
& Hutchison, 2004; van den Wildenberg et al., 2007). Heavy







































































































drinkers with this g-allele exhibited a stronger approach bias
toward alcohol and to other appetitive stimuli than toward positive
and negative stimuli. Heavy drinkers without this allele did not
show an approach bias for any category of stimuli. The gene–
behavior connection clearly merits further study.
Because both valence expectancies and arousal expectancies
play an important role in alcohol-use disorders (e.g., Goldman et
al., 1999), it makes theoretical sense to obtain implicit measures of
arousal associations as well. In an IAT contrasting alcohol with
soft drinks and arousal with sedation, heavy-drinking students
(Wiers et al., 2002, 2005) and alcohol-abuse patients (De Houwer
et al., 2004) had stronger arousal associations than sedation asso-
ciations with alcohol than they did with soft drinks. Consistent
with this, a later study, with a student sample, involving unipolar
IATs (Houben & Wiers, 2006a) found strong IAT alcohol–arousal
associations (see also Houben & Wiers, 2009, with a community
sample) and somewhat weaker IAT alcohol–sedation associations.
Moreover, whereas alcohol–arousal associations were related to
more self-reported alcohol use and problems (see also Houben &
Wiers, 2009), alcohol–sedation associations were related only to
more alcohol problems.
Among 12-year-olds, male drinkers had stronger arousal asso-
ciations than did abstainers, but female drinkers had both weaker
arousal associations and stronger sedation associations than did
abstainers (Thush & Wiers, 2007). Lastly, a unipolar variant of the
EAST assessing associations between alcohol and relaxed was
associated with more self-reported drinking and alcohol problems
(Thush et al., 2007). On the basis of findings of alcohol-induced
heart-rate increases associated with feelings of arousal after drink-
ing alcohol (Conrod, Peterson, & Pihl, 2001), van den Wildenberg
et al. (2006) tested the hypothesis that alcohol–arousal associations
would correlate positively with heart-rate increases after alcohol
consumption. In contrast with expectations, however, an as-yet
unexplained negative association was found between these two
variables.
Experimental validity studies. As predicted by alcohol-
expectancy theory (Goldman et al., 1999), consumption of alcohol
may make positive expectancies of alcohol more accessible. Un-
expectedly, however, consumption of an alcoholic drink prior to
performing the APP did not influence associations with alcohol
(Palfai & Ostafin, 2003a). Another study (Birch et al., 2008)
addressed the influence of a mood manipulation on associations
with alcohol, comparing people who drink to increase positive
affect (enhancement motives, reward) with people who drink to
decrease negative affect (coping motives, relief). These are the two
motives that have been related to the development of alcohol use
disorders (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995). After a pos-
itive mood induction, enhancement-motive drinkers associated
alcohol more strongly with reward than with relief. Unexpectedly,
the reverse was not found: After a negative mood induction,
coping-motive drinkers did not associate alcohol more strongly
with relief than with reward (Birch et al., 2008).
In one study, therapy aimed at influencing alcohol expectancies
had a short-lived effect on future alcohol use and only minimally
changed the IAT associations (Wiers et al., 2005). As compared
with a control intervention, this therapy did not lead to more
changes on the valence IAT and produced only a little more
reduction on the arousal IAT. It did, however, affect explicit
arousal expectancies, and this change mediated the short-lived
reduction in drinking. In a related study, a brief motivational
interviewing intervention also did not lead to significant changes
in implicit measures of associations or to reduced drinking (Thush
et al., 2009).
Incremental and predictive validity studies. In most studies
(except in Thush & Wiers, 2007; Wiers et al., 2002, 2005), alcohol
use and problems were assessed retrospectively. Therefore, no
definite conclusions about the direction of the relation between
implicit measures of associations and drinking/problems are pos-
sible. This is a drawback of research on this topic that would be
good to remedy. Importantly, all reported associations of implicit
measures of alcohol associations to measures of drinking behavior
and drinking problems were controlled for the variance explained
by explicit measures.
Stronger positive associations on the unipolar positive IAT, on
(personalized versions of) the bipolar IAT, and on the ID-EAST,
as well as stronger implicit measures of arousal associations,
predicted more self-reported drinking (De Houwer & De Bruycker,
2007; Houben & Wiers, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008b;
Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003; McCarthy & Thompsen, 2006) and a
combination of self-reported drinking and drinking problems
(Houben & Wiers, 2008a). Moreover, an implicit measure com-
bining valence with arousal information was predictive of prospec-
tive alcohol use (Wiers et al., 2002). More research on the ability
of implicit measures to predict the prospective use of alcohol
would be particularly valuable.
Elevated alcohol problems were predicted by (a) elevation on a
unipolar IAT measure of sedation associations (Houben &Wiers,
2006a), (b) elevation on a unipolar IAT measure of arousal asso-
ciations (Houben & Wiers, 2008b), (c) elevation on a personalized
bipolar IAT measure of positive associations (Houben & Wiers,
2007a), and (d) reduction on an EAST measure of negative asso-
ciations (de Jong et al., 2007). In most other studies, sedation
associations (Thush & Wiers, 2007; Thush et al., 2007, 2008),
negative associations (Houben & Wiers, 2008a; Jajodia & Earley-
wine, 2003; McCarthy & Thompsen, 2006; Thush et al., 2007,
2008), and approach associations (Ostafin & Palfai, 2006) have not
predicted alcohol use and/or problems. It is worthy of note, how-
ever, that an increased number of binge-drinking episodes was
predicted by reduced alcohol–avoidance associations (Ostafin &
Palfai, 2006). In adolescent boys, increased binge drinking one
year later was mainly predicted by increased alcohol–arousal and
alcohol–positive associations (Thush & Wiers, 2007). Taken to-
gether, support for incremental validity is strongest for implicit
measures of both positive and arousal associations.
Apart from testing the incremental and predictive validity for
self-reported alcohol use and problems, studies have addressed the
predictive value for appetitive responses to alcohol. Increased IAT
alcohol–approach associations were related to some appetitive
responses when alcohol consumption was anticipated: increased
urge to drink, more positive expected outcomes, and increased
affective arousal responses (Palfai & Ostafin, 2003b). Reduced
IAT alcohol–avoid associations were related to alcohol desirability
ratings, but this effect disappeared when controlling for explicit
drinking motives (Ostafin & Palfai, 2006).
Finally, as has been done in eating disorder research (e.g.,
Hofmann et al., 2007), moderating effects of variables related to
the availability of cognitive resources have been examined.
Working-memory capacity moderated the relation between im-







































































































plicit measures of positive arousal associations and a combined
index of alcohol use and problems. These positive arousal associ-
ations were more strongly predictive of self-reported alcohol use
and problems one month later in at-risk adolescents with low
working-memory capacity than in those with high working-
memory capacity (Thush et al., 2008). Extending the results to a
measure of actual beer consumption showed that an implicit mea-
sure of beer associations was predictive of beer consumption when
self-regulatory resources were low but not when they were high
(Friese et al., 2008, Study 3; cf. Hofmann et al., 2007). Similarly,
an implicit measure of beer associations was only predictive of
beer consumption in a so-called taste test in an ego-depletion
condition (Ostafin, Marlatt, & Greenwald, 2008). Finally, self-
activation had a similar moderating effect: A bipolar IAT was
predictive only of self-reported alcohol consumption in a self-
activation condition (Perugini et al., 2007). Taken together, these
findings can be interpreted as supportive of the hypothesis derived
from the dual-process view that implicit measures of associations
are predictive of behavior primarily when cognitive control is
relatively weak (see also Wiers & Stacy, 2010).
Summary. Although early studies with the regular IAT sug-
gested negative associations with alcohol in drinking participants,
later research with adaptations of the IAT and other paradigms
showed that drinkers also have positive associations with alcohol.
Importantly, the positive associations with alcohol were predictive
of alcohol use. In addition, approach–avoid motivation and arousal
associations also were related to self-reported drinking and appet-
itive responses. Two studies showed that implicit measures were
mostly predictive of alcohol use in people with low cognitive
resources. Finally, implicit measures of associations were influ-
enced by mood and minimally by therapy.
Nicotine Dependence
Table 11 presents the results of studies on nicotine dependence.
Characteristic of nicotine dependence is the fact that smoking is
continued despite significant nicotine-related problems (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000). As in alcohol use disorders, posi-
tive outcome expectancies are an important cognitive factor ex-
plaining smoking behavior. Expectancies related both to positive
reinforcement (e.g., “smoking makes me feel good”) and to neg-
ative reinforcement (e.g., “smoking helps me relax”) are important
predictors of smoking behavior (e.g., Brandon & Baker, 1991;
Hine, Honan, Marks, & Brettschneider, 2007). Seemingly at odds
with this notion, smokers’ explicit measures of attitudes toward
smoking are typically neutral at best, although they are less neg-
ative than those of nonsmokers (e.g., Chassin, Presson, Sherman,
& Edwards, 1991; Stacy, Bentler, & Flay, 1994). In line with the
importance of positive expectancies for explaining smoking be-
havior, implicit measures are expected to reflect positive associa-
tions with smoking. Implicit–explicit correlations range from r 
.08 to .69.
Studies comparing groups with a disorder to controls. On an
IAT, smokers have repeatedly been shown to have negative associa-
tions with smoking relative to both positive (e.g., exercise) and neutral
(e.g., shapes) contrast categories, with their negative associations
being either not different from nonsmokers (Experiment 1 of
Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001) or less negative than
those of nonsmokers (Chassin, Presson, Rose, Sherman, & Prost,
2002; Experiment 1 of Huijding, de Jong, Wiers, & Verkooijen,
2005 Experiment 1 of Perugini, 2005). On a personalized IAT,
smokers associated smoking more with negative than with positive
social consequences (Kahler, Daughters, Leventhal, Gwaltney, &
Palfai, 2007). With a negative contrast category (i.e., stealing),
both smokers and nonsmokers were relatively positive about
smoking and did not differ in the strength of their associations
(Experiment 2 of Robinson, Meier, Zetocha, & McCaul, 2005;
Experiment 2 of Swanson et al., 2001). Similar results were
obtained on a self-identification IAT: Both smokers and nonsmok-
ers identified more with smoking than with stealing, but this time
the effect was more pronounced for the smokers (Experiment 2 of
Swanson et al., 2001). Perhaps substituting a negative contrast
category (e.g., lying) that is more morally ambiguous would be
more revealing.
When nonsmoking was used as the contrast category, smokers
either displayed negative associations (Experiment 3 of Swanson
et al., 2001; Waters et al., 2007) or ambivalent associations (Ex-
periments 1 and 2 of Robinson et al., 2005) with smoking. The
strength of their negative associations with smoking decreased
with higher levels of dependence (Waters et al., 2007). As ex-
pected, nonsmokers displayed more pronounced negative associ-
ations with smoking (Robinson et al., 2005; Experiment 3 of
Swanson et al., 2001). On a self-identification IAT, smokers
identified more strongly with smoking than with nonsmoking,
whereas nonsmokers showed the reverse (Experiment 3 of Swan-
son et al., 2001). On a go/no-go IAT with neutral stimuli on the
no-go trials, smokers also showed ambivalence toward smoking in
that they associated smoking equally with good and with bad,
whereas nonsmokers associated smoking more with bad (Bassett
& Dabbs, 2005). An alternative way to understand why unex-
pected relatively negative associations have frequently been found
in smokers is, once again, to separate the positive and negative
dimensions in unipolar IATs. A positive unipolar IAT with a
neutral contrast category (i.e., smoking vs. birds) was positively
correlated with self-reported smoking (McCarthy & Thompsen,
2006). Thus, the more smoking behavior was reported, the more
positive were the associations with smoking. A negative unipolar
IAT was not related to self-reported smoking.
Of course, not all smoking cues are alike. Some may reflect the
positive sensory aspects of smoking (e.g., a cigarette held in a
hand); others might remind people of the negative health and
economic aspects of smoking (e.g., the warning on the package).
In one study, an APP was sensitive to the type of cue that was used
as the prime in that smokers had negative associations with pic-
tures showing smoking-related packaging information but positive
associations with pictures depicting sensory aspects of smoking
(Sherman et al., 2003). In that same study, the IAT showed no
sensitivity to the type of cue, perhaps because of the overpowering
effects of the category labels of the IAT (e.g., target dimension:
smoking vs. cuddly animals; De Houwer, 2001). Consistent with
the importance of distinguishing between types of smoking cues,
on a SC-IAT measure with pictorial stimuli focusing on the sen-
sory aspects of smoking, smokers had positive associations with
smoking, whereas nonsmokers had negative associations (Hui-
jding & de Jong, 2006a). An alternative explanation for the lack of
positive associations with smoking in smokers in IAT studies may
be that the IAT reflects the negative (stigmatized) cultural conno-
tation of smoking rather than a personal association (Karpinski &








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004; but see Nosek & Hansen,
2008). Indeed, on a personalized version of the IAT, smokers
displayed clearly positive associations and nonsmokers displayed
clearly negative associations for smoking pictures relative to non-
smoking pictures (De Houwer, Custers, & De Clercq, 2006).
Findings with measures of approach and avoidance have fre-
quently—but not always—been in line with expectations. Al-
though smokers showed neutral or ambivalent associations with
smoking pictures relative to nonsmoking pictures on a valence
IAT, they showed approach associations on an approach–avoid
IAT. Nonsmokers showed negative and avoid associations (De
Houwer et al., 2006). Converging evidence was obtained with an
SRC task: Although participants were faster overall to approach
smoking pictures and avoid neutral pictures than vice versa, this
approach bias was significantly stronger in smokers than in non-
smokers (Bradley, Field, Mogg, & De Houwer, 2004; Mogg et al.,
2003). Unexpectedly, the approach bias was stronger in low than
in moderately dependent participants (Mogg et al., 2005). Finally,
the valence of the smoking stimuli affected SRC results: Smokers
showed a stronger approach bias toward negative smoking stimuli
than did nonsmokers, whereas smokers and nonsmokers displayed
an equally strong approach bias toward positive smoking stimuli
(Bradley, Field, Healy, & Mogg, 2008).
Experimental validity studies. In both a smoking setting and
a neutral lab setting, participants showed a relatively negative asso-
ciation with smoking on the IAT and a neutral/ambivalent attitude on
the AST (Study 2 of Huijding et al., 2005). Watching antitobacco ads
(as compared with watching antimarijuana ads) did not signifi-
cantly influence negative tobacco associations either (Czyzewska
& Ginsburg, 2007). Because smoking is associated with alcohol
consumption during social events, alcohol could activate positive
associations with smoking. However, unexpectedly, the consump-
tion of a small quantity of alcohol did not affect the strength of the
approach bias in smokers (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005b), al-
though it did increase the positive explicit rating of smoking-
related pictures.
Deprivational state in both heavy and light smokers affected
implicit measures of associations with smoking (Sherman et al.,
2003). In the APP, light smokers had more positive associations
with smoking pictures when they had just smoked than when they
were deprived. Conversely, heavy smokers had more negative
associations with smoking pictures when they had just smoked
than when they were deprived. As Sherman et al. (2003) sug-
gested, heavy smokers may have displayed more negative associ-
ations with smoking when they had just smoked because of neg-
ative feelings about this socially undesirable behavior or about
their dependence. In addition, less negative associations with
smoking when deprived may be caused by increased craving. On
the IAT, light smokers had more negative associations with smok-
ing than did heavy smokers, and the deprivation manipulation did
not affect the results.
As Waters et al. (2007) argued, the deprivation manipulation
used by Sherman et al. (2003) may not have been long enough for
an effect to occur on the IAT. Therefore, Waters et al. increased
the deprivation duration to 12 hr and additionally tested the effect
of smoking a cigarette 40 min before completion of the IAT. The
IAT effect was more negative when participants received a ciga-
rette 40 min before the IAT and were allowed to smoke normally
before the experiment than when they did not receive a cigarette
and/or were asked to abstain before the experiment. This pattern of
results is in accordance with the results for the heavy smokers in
the Sherman et al. (2003) study. These heavy smokers (15
cigarettes a day) likely resemble the participants in the study of
Waters et al. (2007; M  20.2 cigarettes a day). Other research
suggests that early childhood experiences with smoking, which are
mostly negative, are also related to current associations with smok-
ing as assessed by an IAT (Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2007),
whereas recent experiences with smoking are unrelated to implicit
measures of associations with smoking.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. A positive
unipolar IAT measure predicted self-reported frequency of smok-
ing over and above questionnaire expectancy measures (McCarthy
& Thompsen, 2006). Implicit measures of associations were also
predictive of smoking abstinence at two and eight weeks after quit
date and remained predictive when controlling for the number of
smokers in the social environment and explicit expectancies
(Kahler et al., 2007). Finally, more positive associations with
smoking as indexed by the single-target IAT were significantly
related to a higher level of craving at the end of the experiment
(Huijding & de Jong, 2006a). An IAT with nonsmoking as the
contrast category was also related to self-reported craving but not
to the startle response on smoking pictures compared with neutral
pictures, a physiological measure of affective processing (Waters
et al., 2007).
Summary. On the IAT, smokers’ associations with smoking
were mostly negative when compared with a positive or neutral
contrast category, or they were at best ambivalent when compared
to nonsmoking—although often less negative than in nonsmokers.
Interestingly, when associations toward the specifically sensory
aspects of smoking were assessed, or when a personalized version
of the IAT was used, smokers showed positive associations with
smoking. In addition, a substantial amount of support was found
for approach associations with smoking in smokers. Deprivational
state appeared to affect associations with smoking, but measure-
ment context (smoking setting vs. neutral lab setting) and the
consumption of alcohol did not. Implicit measures of associations
were predictive of self-reported smoking, smoking abstinence, and
self-reported craving. Implicit measures actually seem to have
been quite informative in the domains of eating, drinking alcohol,
and smoking, suggesting an important role in appetitive situations.
Cannabis and Cocaine Dependence
Table 12 presents the results of studies on cannabis and cocaine
dependence. A characteristic of cannabis and cocaine dependence
is that drug use continues despite significant drug-related problems
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). As with alcohol use
disorders and nicotine dependence, expectancies regarding differ-
ent types of reinforcement (e.g., social and emotional facilitation)
have been shown to be important predictors of cannabis use
(Alfonso & Dunn, 2007; Mullens, Young, Dunne, & Norton, 2010)
and of cocaine use (Stacy, Newcomb, & Bentler, 1995). In line
with the expectancy literature, associations with cannabis and
cocaine would be expected to be positive and arousal related.
Reported implicit–explicit correlations are low (r  .23).
Studies comparing groups with a disorder to controls. On
an IAT, no clear positive association with cannabis has been found
among cannabis users. Nonusers displayed a more negative asso-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ciation with cannabis than with the neutral control category on the
IAT, and their associations were more negative than those of
cannabis users (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004). In line with
research on nicotine dependence, results of an approach–avoidance
measure (SRC task) confirmed expectations: Cannabis users, but
not nonusers, were faster to approach than to avoid cannabis
stimuli (Field, Eastwood, Bradley, & Mogg, 2006). Only one study
has reported implicit measures of cocaine associations (Wiers,
Houben, & de Kraker, 2007). Four unipolar IATs were used
(positive, negative, arousal, and sedation; all relative to neutral),
with cocaine versus sports as the concept categories. Cocaine-
dependent participants displayed stronger arousal, positive, and
sedation associations with cocaine than did controls, but no group
difference was found for cocaine–negative associations.
Experimental validity studies. Implicit measures of associ-
ations with cannabis were negative in students. This effect was
stronger when the IAT was administered after anticannabis ads
than after antitobacco ads (Czyzewska & Ginsburg, 2007). No
such studies exist for cocaine, so this is a very meager experimen-
tal literature at present.
Incremental and predictive validity studies. Using a unipo-
lar IAT measure, Ames et al. (2007) found that associations
between cannabis and the attribute excited were predictive of
self-reported cannabis use, after controlling for demographic vari-
ables and explicit beliefs. This pattern was not evident for unipolar
IAT measures with the attributes relaxed or negative. In addition,
two unipolar multiple-drug EAST measures (excited, relaxed; both
compared to neutral) did not contribute to the explained variance.
General Discussion
We have covered the use of implicit measures with 12 catego-
ries of disorder, some with very limited literatures and some with
quite extensive literatures. In the first part of the General Discus-
sion, we integrate research findings over these various forms of
psychopathology, organized according to the same three categories
as used throughout the previous section: studies comparing groups
with a disorder with controls, experimental validity studies, and
incremental and predictive validity studies. In the second part, we
address issues relating to the interpretation of implicit measures. In
closing, we consider the bigger picture, including directions for
future research.
Integration of Findings
Studies comparing groups having a disorder with controls.
For specific phobia, pedophilia, and to some extent anorexia
nervosa, the majority of findings were consistent with theoretical
expectations. People with spider phobia and spider-fearful individ-
uals showed the expected negative associations with spiders (e.g.,
Huijding & de Jong, 2005b), and people with pedophilia had
child–sex associations (Gray et al., 2005). Thus, the implicit mea-
sures of associations were disorder congruent and were strongest
in or limited to the disordered group. For anorexia, the results were
largely as expected: Implicit measures of food evaluations were
either unaffected by the palatability and fat content of the foods
(Roefs, Stapert, et al., 2005) or were negative for high-fat foods
(de Jong & Veenstra, 2007). However, instead of an avoidance of
high-fat foods, only a reduced approach bias was found. Thus,
findings with implicit measures for these disorders provide con-
verging evidence for dysfunctional beliefs that are characteristic of
these disorders.
Unexpected patterns of results emerged for depressive disorder,
social phobia, and BDD. Although cognitive models of these
disorders (e.g., D.A. Clark et al., 1999) predict negative self-
esteem, implicit measures consistently have suggested positive
self-esteem (e.g., De Raedt et al., 2006). Limited support for the
cognitive models comes from the few studies (e.g., de Jong, 2002;
Meites et al., 2008; Steinberg et al., 2007) that found weaker
positive self-esteem in the disordered group than in healthy con-
trols. Lower positive self-esteem may provide a weaker buffer
against negative experiences, increasing vulnerability to onset
and/or maintenance for those with disorders. Several explanations
have been put forward for the unexpected finding of positive
implicit measures of and negative explicit measures of self-esteem
in these disorders. Franck et al. (2007) considered that this is either
due to unstable self-esteem or to a discrepancy between high
standards and negative perceived reality, both of which have been
related to depressive symptomatology (Roberts & Monroe, 1994;
Weiner & White, 1982). However, these are post hoc explanations,
untested as yet.
Because self-esteem was almost always measured by the IAT
rather than by other measurement procedures in these studies, it
may be too soon to conclude that the role of negative self-esteem
in cognitive models of psychopathology should be revised. In all
studies, the comparison category was other or “not me,” which
may also yield biased results. Recall that the IAT is a relative
measure that permits only the conclusion that the evaluation of the
self is more positive than that of the other (see Pinter & Green-
wald, 2005). Thus, it could be that, even though disordered and
healthy people show similar IAT effects, disordered people have
more negative associations with both the self and the other than do
healthy people. Interesting in this respect is a study in which the
comparison category other was changed to friend or ingroup, both
of which are obviously positive. Even with these comparison
categories, evidence for positive self-esteem was found in a
healthy sample (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). The use of these and
other alternative comparison categories could be explored in future
research on self-esteem in depressed, socially phobic, and BDD
groups.
Future research should use paradigms that do not require a
comparison category, such as the SC-IAT (Karpinski & Steinman,
2006), to assess associations with the self without referring to the
other. Additionally, unipolar variants of the IAT could be used in
an attempt to assess the positive and negative associations inde-
pendently. Finally, it would be interesting to study other poten-
tially disorder-relevant associations as well. For example, given
the association between mood disorders and suicide ideation and
attempts, it could be informative to obtain implicit measures of
self-injury associations. These measures have been shown to dis-
tinguish between nonsuicidal participants, suicide ideators, and
suicide attempters and to predict future suicide ideation (Nock &
Banaji, 2007).
For panic disorder and social phobia, another unexpected asso-
ciation with the self emerged in the form of evidence for me–calm
associations (e.g., Gamer et al., 2008; Teachman, 2005). These
associations were reduced in a disordered group, but this pattern
does not strictly fit the characteristic dysfunctional beliefs of these







































































































disorders. However, in a study involving the semantic priming
paradigm (Schneider & Schulte, 2007), evidence for disorder-
congruent associations was found for panic disorder patients; that
is, bodily sensations were associated with catastrophic interpreta-
tions. Taken together, then, implicit measures were partly consis-
tent with theoretical expectations.
Associations with craved substances (food, alcohol, nicotine,
and drugs) reflected both the positive (e.g., high-fat foods taste
good) and the negative (e.g., alcohol can give you a hangover)
aspects of these substances. In research on nicotine dependence,
the valence of the contrast category heavily influenced the direc-
tion of IAT effects: Whereas incongruent negative associations
were generally found when a neutral (e.g., nonsmoking) or positive
(e.g., exercise) contrast category was used (e.g., Chassin et al.,
2002), congruent positive associations were found when negative
(e.g., stealing) contrast categories or unipolar or single-category
variants were used (e.g., Robinson et al., 2005). This pattern
highlights an inherent limitation of the original IAT when no
natural opposing category exists. In a similar vein, unexpected
negative associations with craved substances have been found in
alcohol and obesity research with the bipolar IAT (e.g., Roefs &
Jansen, 2002; Wiers et al., 2002). In alcohol research, this com-
plexity has been resolved by assessing the positive and negative
associations separately. Using this approach, clear evidence for
both the expected positive and the unexpected negative associa-
tions with alcohol has been found (e.g., Houben & Wiers, 2006a).
In research on eating and nicotine dependence, many studies have
found evidence for negative associations with the craved sub-
stances (e.g., Roefs & Jansen, 2002). Interestingly, however, pos-
itive associations with the craved substances emerged when the
sensory aspects—as opposed to the health consequences—were
emphasized (e.g., Roefs et al., 2006).
Thus, the idea that substance users and overeaters would be
characterized by implicit measures of positive associations with
their craved substances is evidently too simplistic. Theories con-
cerning overeating and alcohol and drug abuse need to accommo-
date the often-observed negative associations with craved sub-
stances, in addition to the expected positive associations. In
substance users and overeaters, associations with the negative
consequences of their use of alcohol, high-fat foods, nicotine, or
drugs do appear to be present. This knowledge seems so accessi-
ble, in fact, that it even affects implicit measures of associations
with these craved substances. Future research should carefully
consider whether measures reflect associations with the sensory or
the health-related aspects and preferably should assess positive and
negative associations separately.
Finally, for dyspareunia, OCD, pain disorder, and PTSD, group
differences were mostly inconsistent with theoretical expectations.
For dyspareunia (Brauer et al., 2009) and OCD (e.g., Teachman et
al., 2006), disorder-incongruent associations were found that did
not differ between a disordered or symptomatic group and a
healthy group. For pain disorder, only two studies (Goubert et al.,
2003; Vancleef et al., 2007) found evidence for disorder-congruent
associations specifically in disordered groups. The one relevant
study on PTSD (Engelhard et al., 2007) unexpectedly found that
self-invulnerable associations decreased with increasing PTSD
symptoms. We hasten to emphasize, however, that research in
these domains has been limited, so it is too early to draw firm
conclusions from these unexpected findings.
It is striking that many findings for different disorders did not fit
the theoretical expectations. Is this possibly because the theoretical
expectations derive primarily from consideration of explicit factors
only? For positive implicit self-esteem in depressive disorder,
social phobia, and BDD, and negative associations with craved
substances in food, alcohol, and drug-related disorders, these un-
expected findings were so consistently reported that theories on
these disorders should accommodate these findings. In other in-
stances—OCD, dyspareunia, PTSD, pain disorder, and panic dis-
order—the number of studies is still too limited or the diversity of
findings too large to argue for accommodation of the findings. In
these instances, inconsistent findings may partly be explained by
problems with the measurement procedures, such as low reliability
or unsuitable stimuli, or by insufficient development of the theo-
ries themselves.
Experimental validity studies. As compared with the
known-groups approach, relatively few experimental studies have
been conducted. Those studies that have taken this approach have
often found the expected effect of the manipulation on the implicit
measures. For example, priming with spiders as opposed to hu-
mans elicited negative associations with ambiguous spider-related
words in spider-fearful participants (Ellwart et al., 2005), a nega-
tive mood induction led to reduced self-positive associations in
formerly depressed participants (e.g., Gemar et al., 2001), and
inductions of craving and hunger affected associations with food
positively in healthy and eating-disordered participants (e.g., Seibt
et al., 2007). Although limited in number, these studies are con-
sistent with the view that the processes indexed by the implicit
measure play a role in the studied psychopathology. It is worth
noting, however, that explicit measures would be expected to
produce the same pattern, so the added value for the implicit
measures will need to be carefully considered.
There are even fewer studies of treatment on implicit measures
of associations. For specific phobia, social phobia, pain disorder
and panic disorder, successful exposure therapy or CBT was
associated with significant improvements on implicit measures of
disorder-relevant associations (e.g., Grumm et al., 2008; Teach-
man & Woody, 2003). Interestingly, for panic disorder, cognitive
changes preceded symptom reduction (Teachman et al., 2008). For
obesity, a successful weight-loss treatment did not lead to the
predicted changes in implicit measures of associations with food
and physical activity (Craeynest et al., 2008). Similarly, in the
context of alcohol dependence, results showed no effect of moti-
vational interviewing (Thush et al., 2009) and only a weak effect
of an expectancy challenge intervention (Wiers et al., 2005) on
implicit measures of alcohol associations. Note that these inter-
ventions either had no effect (motivational interviewing) or only a
short-lived effect (expectancy challenge) on drinking behavior.
One question that remains for further research is whether observed
changes in implicit measures after treatment are causally related to
symptom improvement or are merely an epiphenomenon. The
study on panic disorder that showed that cognitive changes pre-
ceded symptom reduction (Teachman et al., 2008) is a first step in
addressing this question. Another important question is whether
certain implicit measures of associations are predictive of symp-
tom onset. Of course, the holy grail would be to find an implicit
measure that both predicts disorder onset and is sensitive to suc-
cessful treatment of the disorder—and ideally is not coincident
with explicit measures.







































































































Incremental and predictive validity studies. Importantly,
implicit measures explained variance in a range of behavioral
measures in addition to that explained by explicit measures. This
was the case for performance on a spider behavioral-avoidance test
(e.g., Teachman & Woody, 2003), panic symptoms (e.g., Teach-
man et al., 2007), mirror avoidance (Clerkin & Teachman, 2009),
self-reported alcohol use (e.g., Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003), and
food choice (e.g., Perugini, 2005). In the context of alcohol abuse,
increased alcohol–positive and alcohol–arousal associations pre-
dicted increases in drinking behavior and alcohol problems. Note
that problem drinkers also consistently showed negative associa-
tions with alcohol, but these did not predict drinking behavior. In
addition, in keeping with dual-process models of information
processing (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), some evidence
was found for the idea that implicit measures are specifically
predictive of spontaneous types of behavior, such as the startle
response in the context of specific phobia (Huijding & de Jong,
2006b) and immediate affective reactions in the context of depres-
sion (Haeffel et al., 2007). Implicit measures are potentially most
valuable when they complement rather than coincide with explicit
measures.
Finally, another interesting and promising approach has been the
study of moderating variables of the relation between implicit
measures and behavior in the context of eating behavior (e.g.,
Hofmann et al., 2009) and problem drinking (e.g., Thush et al.,
2008). Generally, implicit measures of associations were predic-
tive of behavior only when cognitive resources were limited either
by an experimental manipulation or as an individual difference
factor. We take this to be an important insight emerging from this
review. Future research needs to address whether overeaters and
problem drinkers more often suffer from conditions in which
cognitive resources are limited. If this were true, then the behavior
of these individuals would more often be guided by their implicit
measures of associations with the craved substance, helping to
explain their disordered behavior. Of course, the direction of
causality must also be considered: Does the limitation on cognitive
resources precede the problem behavior, or does focusing on the
problem behavior itself result in limited resources?
This evidence for the predictive power of implicit measures fits
the results of a recent meta-analysis by Greenwald, Poehlman,
Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009), in which an average r  .27 was
found between implicit measures and behavior, judgment, and
psychophysiological measures. Implicit and explicit measures both
explained unique variance, proving the value of both in the pre-
diction of behavior. The predictive validity of explicit measures
was reduced for socially sensitive topics, for which socially desir-
able answering tendencies may affect self-report measures. Thus,
although we cannot draw conclusions about the uniqueness of
implicit measures from (a lack of) implicit–explicit correlations,
evidence for incremental predictive power demonstrates the added
value of implicit measures. For a lively debate about the predictive
validity of the IAT for discriminatory behavior, see Blanton et al.
(2009); McConnell and Leibold (2009); and Ziegert and Hanges
(2009).
Interpretation Issues With Implicit Measures
The aim of many of the reviewed studies was to use implicit
measures to shed greater light on the dysfunctional beliefs that are
characteristic for a disorder according to a cognitive perspective.
Obviously, the conclusions of the studies depend on the validity of
the implicit measures used. With an unexpected result involving an
assessment tool, it may be difficult to determine whether the
outcome of the measurement procedure was not valid or the theory
is wrong. Several potential pitfalls accompany the translation of
implicit measurement outcomes to psychological attributes and
models of psychopathology. First, in principle, one cannot be
certain “whether different attributes underlie explicit and implicit
measures or whether both measures reflect the same attribute
under different conditions” (De Houwer et al., 2009a, p. 351).
Second, Blanton and Jaccard (2006) have expressed the position
that it is not warranted to assume that the zero-point of the IAT
(and probably of other implicit measures as well) corresponds to
the true zero-point of the to-be-measured psychological attribute
(but see Greenwald, Nosek, & Siriam, 2006). This issue may, as
Blanton and Jaccard argued as well, however, be less problematic
when studying theoretical processes than when attempting to as-
sess a psychological attribute of a person. Third, the extent to
which implicit measures are informative for cognitive models of
psychopathology is limited by the implicitness of these measures
(i.e., the extent to which implicit measures reflect uncontrollable,
nonconscious, and fast mechanisms) and our understanding of the
processes by which psychological attributes cause the measure-
ment outcomes (De Houwer et al., 2009a).
More research certainly is needed both on the implicitness of
measures and on how psychological attributes express themselves
in measurement outcomes. Researchers must realize that no mea-
sure is fully implicit or fully explicit (see Jacoby, 1991, for
discussion of the impurity of tasks in terms of isolating unique
processes). In an attempt to handle this problem, a modeling
approach might be taken for estimating implicit and explicit com-
ponents of measurement outcomes. An example would be the
quadruple-process model (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugen-
berg, & Groom, 2005), the goal of which is to “quantitatively
disentangle the influences of four distinct processes on implicit
task performance: the likelihood that automatic bias is activated by
a stimulus; that a correct response can be determined; that auto-
matic bias is overcome; and that, in the absence of other informa-
tion, a guessing bias drives responses” (Conrey et al., 2005, p.
469).
Still, as Nosek and Greenwald (2009) advocated, there is no
need to wait until everything is known about implicit measures
before these measures can be applied, the circularity of that idea
notwithstanding. If the measurement outcomes show predictive
validity and reliably distinguish between groups, then they are
useful both in applied settings and potentially in theory refine-
ment—at least to the extent that the implicit measures are not
redundant with the explicit measures. Of course, to be able to make
reasonable theoretical claims about what an implicit measure ac-
tually assesses, ongoing basic research is needed (De Houwer,
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009b). What we have
shown in this review is that implicit measures are at least partially
distinct from explicit measures and that there is, for some disor-
ders, convergence across implicit measures. This justifies the
continuing application and exploration of these indices in the
context of psychopathology.








































































































Implicit measures distinguished disordered from healthy people
in several domains of psychopathology, similar to what has been
achieved in the past by the emotional Stroop paradigm (Williams,
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), thereby providing converging evi-
dence for the validity of the cognitive models of the dysfunctional
beliefs in these types of psychopathology. However, we find it
remarkable that often the observed implicit measure of association
did not fit predictions from the cognitive model of the studied
psychopathology. In two instances (self-esteem and negative as-
sociations with craved substances) findings were unexpected but
so consistently reported that they have implications for the revision
of cognitive theories of these disorders.
For future research, it is important to select the best paradigm
for the research question (De Houwer et al., 2009a), taking into
consideration, for example, (a) whether effects are expected on the
category versus the exemplar level of the stimuli used; (b) whether
a relative or an absolute measure of associations is suitable; (c)
which stimuli best fit the psychological attribute of interest (e.g.,
idiographic stimuli, Schneider & Schulte, 2007); (d) in what sense
the expected effects are thought to be implicit; and (e) the reli-
ability of the measure. In this regard, we call for stepping up
efforts to measure—and indeed to find ways to increase—the
reliability of implicit measures. In addition, we would like to see
more studies where multiple implicit measures are included, so
that their relative success and their convergence can be evaluated,
ideally against that of explicit measures included in the same
study. And we believe that circumstances of reduced cognitive
resources warrant particular attention because it may be especially
in these circumstances that implicit measures prove to be most
informative.
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the use of
implicit measures in psychopathology, just as in other domains of
psychological inquiry. Despite ongoing debates about their inter-
pretation and reliability, their possible independence from overt
reports has made them highly attractive to many researchers in this
field. In some areas, unexpected but consistent patterns in the
results already call for theoretical modifications, whereas in other
areas implicit measures provide converging evidence for the va-
lidity of the cognitive models for the disorders. In still other areas,
factors related to task design or a low number of studies have
hampered rapid progress. We concur with De Houwer et al.
(2009a) that future research must seek to reveal the processes by
which psychological attributes cause the measurement outcomes
and to examine in what sense certain measures can (and cannot) be
considered implicit. It has always been fundamental to our under-
standing of psychological processes that much lies beneath the
surface: For this reason, implicit measures are especially intrigu-
ing.
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